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INTRODUCTION

A fundamental disagreement among legal ethics scholars concerns
the difference between client-centered and justice-centered approaches
to lawyers' ethical obligations. Stated most simply, advocates of clientcentered approaches put lawyers' duty to the client first. Scholars closely
identified with clinical legal education, poverty law, and indigent
criminal defense frequently advocate client-centered approaches.1 In
contrast, justice-centered approaches critique the elevation of the client's
interests over other important concerns lawyers affect through the work
they do on behalf of clients. Scholars who adopt justice-centered
approaches argue that lawyers' ethical obligations should be analyzed
with a paramount focus on achieving justice. David Luban, 2 William
Simon,3 Robert Gordon,4 Deborah Rhode,5 Bradley Wendel, 6 and
1. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-CenteredCounseling: Reappraisaland Refinement,
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 511-23 (1990) (outlining the arguments for a client-centered approach,
focusing on clinical legal education and representation of indigent clients). See also Binny Miller,
Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrativein Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485,
488 (1994); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications:Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242-43 (1993) [hereinafter Ogletree, Beyond Justifications];
Lucie E. White, Subordination,Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes of the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1990).
2.

See, e.g., DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY, at xvii-xviii

(1988).
3.

See, e.g., WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS'

ETHICS 9, 138-39(1998).
4. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23-24
(1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence].
5.

See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL

PROFESSION 17-18 (2000).
6. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 363,364 (2004).
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Russell Pearce 7 are leading proponents of justice-centered approaches. It
is less clear that these scholars come from shared practice locationsunless legal academia should be considered such a location-but it does
seem fair to characterize much of the work of these scholars as centrally
concerned with the way in which lawyers for relatively powerful clients,
especially the huge corporate entities that masquerade in law as
"persons," can cause great harm to the fragile fabric of public regulatory
law.
Legal ethicists often view these two approaches as inconsistent with
each other, but I argue in this Article that they are not. Instead, clientcentered and justice-centered approaches represent two potential
emphases, and choices between them should be tailored to the context of
the legal representation. I propose a partial theory for how this
calibration of ethics to context should occur. Drawing on an insight
shared among many contemporary legal ethics scholars, I first note that
ethics analysis must be context-specific in some respects. David Wilkins
and others have forcefully developed this line of argument: The central
concerns for ethics analysis sometimes vary by practice setting.8 For
example, the legal ethics problems of most concern in lawyers'
representation of relatively powerless persons are very different from the
problems of most concern in lawyers' representation of powerful
institutional clients. At this historical moment in the development of
legal ethics thought, this insight is well accepted, at least in some

7. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 281-82 (1992) [hereinafter Pearce, Republican Origins].
8. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 814-19
(1992) (arguing that the best institutional mechanisms for regulating lawyers vary with practice

context). Wilkins, perhaps, has been the most eloquent advocate of context-specific regulation, but a
great many other scholars have by now pursued similar points. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, A New
Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1215 (2003)
[hereinafter Gordon, New Role]; David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 1729, 1731 (1993) (focusing on issues such as "the balance of advantages in criminal
prosecutions," including the "balance of bargaining power," to justify the client-centered ethics of
criminal defenders). Likewise, empirical scholars of the legal profession, such as Lynn Mather and

Tanina Rostain, have undertaken careful studies of how practice context correlates with differences
in lawyers' perceptions of how to provide good legal services to their clients. See, e.g., LYNN
MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM IN PRACTICE 13

(2001) (detailing a study of different ethics orientations of differently situated divorce lawyers in
small New England towns); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up from Uneasy Dreams: Professional
Context, Discretionary Judgment, and The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 955, 961-66 (1999)

(summarizing empirical literature on how practice context affects legal ethics orientation).
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circles, 9 but much work remains to be done to incorporate this insight
into the legal ethics analysis.' °
The challenge I undertake in this Article is to probe why legal
ethicists' emphasis on the priority of client- versus justice-centered
considerations varies with practice context. What, for example, accounts
for the view of many justice-centered ethicists that it is appropriate to
defend with utmost vigor a criminal defendant who has committed
murder, but not a corporate polluter who has slightly increased the
cancer risk in a surrounding community by negligence in controlling the
release of potentially toxic substances? Although it is difficult to argue
that the murderer has done less injustice than the careless corporation,
many justice-centered legal ethicists still assert that the murderer
deserves client-centered representation while the corporate polluter does
not." The task is to search for the underlying factors that produce such
conclusions.
I propose in this Article that one important factor that accounts for
these context-specific results is the relative power of the client or
interests being represented in comparison to the power of the adversary
and other interests at stake in the representation. Of course, client power
is not-and should not be-the only factor guiding lawyers' ethical
judgments, but I argue here that it is an important one in situations
power imbalances among the interests
involving obvious and substantial
2
affected by the representation.'
9. Not all legal ethicists, of course, share this view, but for purposes of my analysis here, I
wish to build on the work of scholars who have defended this claim in order to further analyze how
a context-based approach might work.
10. Indeed, to survey the new model rules the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission recently
promulgated is to be reminded that, where the "rules meet the road," so to speak-that is, in the
template to which states turn in drafting their rules regulating lawyer conduct-much more work
needs to be done to incorporate a context-specific approach into the positive law that regulates
lawyers' practice. For a discussion of the limited ways in which the current ABA Rules of
Professional Conduct embrace context-specific ethics regulation, see infra note 79.
11. See generally Luban, supra note 8 (arguing that zealous advocacy is owed clients in
criminal defense but not in corporate misconduct cases). See also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical
Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L. REv. 589, 605-07 (1985).
12. There are, of course, many other ways legal ethics analysis should be improved, and I do
not pursue all of them here. One reader, for example, has suggested that I should more vigorously
attack the adversarial system. It may very well be that the legal system needs much reform in this
respect, but my focus in this Article is different: I am attempting to think through how legal ethics
principles might be better designed even in a system that is extremely flawed, not only in its
procedural institutions, but also in swaths of substantively unjust law. For further discussion on this
point, see infra Part II.A. 1. Similarly, another commentator has suggested that I should focus more
on lawyers' choice of clients and general type of practice. I wholeheartedly agree that these are
among the most important ethical decisions lawyers make, and have indeed devoted another article
to this topic. See Susan D. Carle, Re-Valuing Lawyeringfor Middle-Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM
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The next question is why relative client power should serve as a
factor in guiding lawyers' exercise of ethical judgment in such
situations. I propose several reasons. Most basically, consideration of
relative client power helps to synthesize valuable aspects of client- and
justice-centered approaches and to target these approaches to the
practice contexts in which they are most appropriate. This tailoring
further helps improve the fit between these approaches and the
jurisprudential traditions on which they are based. A context-specific,
power-sensitive legal ethics norm resonates both with liberalism's
concerns for irresolvable pluralism and the preservation of the dignity
and voice of individuals, and with post-modernism's insights into the
pervasive effects of power on actors' conduct and perspectives. Concern
about client power also resonates with the core communitarian concerns
of justice-centered theorists about the harm done when lawyers engage
in overly zealous advocacy for powerful clients bent on evading laws
designed to protect the public interest. Lawyers' active involvement in
corporate misconduct scandals such as Enron and the Savings and Loan
crisis of the 1980s show that professional conduct regulation alone
cannot stop lawyers from assisting with the commission of such harms;
general norms that guide lawyers' exercise of discretionary judgment are
13
needed as well, as I discuss further below.
Those general ethics norms must push against the temptations of
self-interest, and those temptations vary dramatically depending on the
relative power of lawyers' clients. In the context of representing
powerful clients, lawyers' incentive is to do too much for their clients; in
the context of clients lacking substantial resources, lawyers' incentive is
to do too little. Attention to client power as a factor in guiding lawyers'
exercise of ethical discretion thus provides an ethics norm that resists the
differential moral hazards produced by self-interest in different legal
practice locations. Lawyers' calibration of the zealousness of their
representation in inverse relationship to their clients' power offers a
posture that most directly corrects for this tug of self-interest, a virtue
surely important to ethics principles designed to preserve the
profession's integrity against the pressures of business expediency.
Another important reason that client power should affect lawyers'
ethics analysis is that adding this consideration tempers the flaws or
extremes of pure client- or justice-centered approaches. Justice-centered

L. REv. 719 (2001). In this Article, however, my focus is on lawyers' appropriate conduct after
accepting a particular representation.
13.

See infra Part III.A.
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approaches face powerful criticisms on the grounds that they call for the
paternalistic substitution of lawyers' judgments about matters of
morality and justice for those of clients, especially clients who have few
alternative options for obtaining legal representation.' 4 Using relative
client power to guide lawyers' choices between client- and justicecentered approaches prevents lawyers from imposing their own
substantive visions of justice on clients who cannot easily walk away,
while still calling on lawyers representing powerful interests to refrain
from exploiting opportunities that would bar adequate consideration of
less powerful interests affected by the representation. This approach
indirectly has a justice-regarding aim, in that it seeks to permit
something like "fair" or "just" ends to emerge from the working of legal
processes, but it avoids the problem of asking lawyers to impose their
substantive views of the morality or justice on those clients likely to lack
alternative options for obtaining legal representation.
I develop my argument in favor of consideration of relative client
power as a factor in lawyers' ethical deliberations through the following
steps: In Part II, I sketch the background of the debate between clientcentered and justice-centered approaches, and locate both approaches in
their respective jurisprudential underpinnings in order to explore the
limits of their fit to context. In Part III, I outline my argument as to why,
in situations involving obvious and substantial power imbalances,
relative client power should be a factor in lawyers' ethical deliberations,
and I respond to some of the more obvious objections raised by this
proposal. Finally, in Part IV, I test my model by applying it to a series of
hypotheticals drawn from the work of ethicists in the justice- and clientcentered traditions. I demonstrate through these concrete examples how
attention to client power leads to an analysis somewhat different from
either of these two other alternatives, and argue that this analysis is
superior to the results produced by either alternative in its pure form. A
power-based analysis draws from strengths of both client- and justicecentered perspectives, but better tailors those approaches to the contexts
their underlying principles support.

14.

See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem,

and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 618 (1986) ("For access to the law to be
filtered unequally through the disparate moral views of each individual's lawyer does not appear to
be justifiable.").
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THE DEBATE BETWEEN JUSTICE- AND CLIENT-CENTERED LEGAL

ETHICS APPROACHES
In this Part, I sketch the recent history of the development of
various schools of legal ethics thought in order to situate the debate
between client- and justice-centered approaches for readers who are not
legal ethics experts. Readers intimately familiar with these debates may
want to skip to Part III, though I hope my explication will present a new
way of thinking about a fundamental divide in contemporary legal ethics
theory that will help point to a synthesis of these divergent traditions.
I group these traditions into two basic approaches: justice-centered
views, which emphasize lawyers' duties to attend to the overall justice or
morality of the issues they handle on behalf of clients, and clientcentered approaches, which emphasize lawyers' duties to place their
clients' interests above all other considerations except the bounds of law.
I further discuss the various critiques and responses these sets of legal
ethics scholars make to each other and note some of the jurisprudential
influences important to each group.
A.

The Justice-CenteredView

The justice-centered approach to legal ethics analysis has complex
historical origins.15 It would be far too simple to assert that this view
arose with the critical legal ethics scholarship of the 1970s in the wake
of Watergate, but its most recent origins can be located there, in an
important article by philosopher Richard Wasserstrom,' 6 and in
17
philosopher David Luban's classic book, The Good Lawyer.
Wasserstrom, Luban, and others questioned lawyers' justifications for
adopting a role-specific morality that allows them to pursue their clients'
interests within the bounds of the law with near total disregard for the
other interests affected by their representations. Wasserstrom and Luban
also sought to refute as a matter of moral philosophy the nonaccountability view of lawyers' ethical obligations, which holds that
15. See, e.g., Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 7, at 243-44 (locating justice-centered
strains in antebellum legal ethics thought); Gordon, supra note 4, at 14-16 (examining a late
nineteenth century model of corporate lawyering that emphasized lawyers' independence from and
wise discretionary judgment with respect to client representations); Susan D. Carle, Lawyers' Duty
to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the 1908 Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 29-31
(1999) (examining complex ways in which duty-to-do-justice issues pervaded debate about first
national model rules of legal ethics).
16. See generally Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTS. 1 (1975).
17. THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983).
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lawyers should not be held morally accountable for the 8positions they
take and the advocacy they engage in on behalf of clients.'
Shortly after, starting in the early 1980s, William H. Simon, a
brilliant-and then young-legal scholar, who had previously worked as
a poverty lawyer and clinical law teacher and is now identified with the
critical legal studies movement, began a systematic attack on clientcentered ethics. Simon's early work falls very much in the critical legal
studies mode of deconstruction, focused on pointing out contradictions
and poking holes in traditionally accepted jeremiads.19 In his later work,
however, Simon commits himself to the much harder task of
reconstruction--of rebuilding the conceptual framework of legal ethics
analysis along lines consistent with his critique of client-centered
advocacy. 20 That work has taken him in a very different direction than
that of most clinical theorists, 21 even though his concerns about
achieving greater justice in the American legal system remain, at bottom,
very similar to theirs.
Both Simon and Luban draw on legal history for support of their
arguments in favor of justice-centered legal ethics, arguing that such
conceptions flourished in lawyers' ethics thinking in prior historical
periods.2 2 In this they had the important help of historian and critical
legal studies scholar Robert W. Gordon. Gordon has convincingly
shown how a different view of professional independence existed among
elite corporate lawyers of the late 19th century. 23 He has most recently
continued to write, in the wake of Enron and other recent corporate
scandals, about how such a view should be restored in developing a
separate set of legal ethics dictates for corporate lawyers involved in
regulatory compliance counseling work.24 Other scholars, such as
Russell Pearce, locate justice-centered approaches in civic republicanism

18. This position, however, is still embodied in the ABA Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) cmt. 9 (2006).
19. See generally William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and
Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29.
20. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 9-13.
21. See, e.g., William H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on
Poverty Law Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1100-

01 (1994) [hereinafter Simon, Dark Secret] (criticizing clinical and poverty law scholars for
misguided legal ethics analysis).
22. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 128-32 (invoking Brandeis as a figure exemplifying
justice-centered lawyering); LUBAN, supra note 2, at 238 (invoking Brandeis as a model of a lawyer
committed to the public interest).
23. See Gordon, Independence, supra note 4, at 14-16.
24. See Gordon, New Role, supra note 8, at 1210.
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and turn-of-the-twentieth century Progressivism, 25 and, in yet another
line of exploration by Pearce, Thomas Shaffer and others, in JudeoChristian religion.2 6
1. The Legalists and Moralists
There are significant differences among the views of scholars who
espouse justice-centered ethics approaches. One is between those whom
Wendel recently labeled legalists and moralists.27 The moralists, who
include not only Luban, but also Rhode, Pearce, Shaffer, and many
others, view justice as based in moral intuitions or moral dictates that lie
at least in part outside the prescriptions of law.28 The legalists, to which
school Simon and Wendel belong, present sophisticated arguments that
justice can be found in lawyers' interpretations of legal rules
themselves.2 9 Simon espouses a sophisticated view of legal interpretation
that allows lawyers to probe beneath the dictates of positive law for the
best, most generous understandings of its normative purposes. For
example, Simon reads into U.S. law a legal right to basic standards of
income maintenance, 30 and acknowledges that there are broad swaths of
law, such as criminal justice, where his assumptions about the
underlying justice of law's purposes must be suspended . 3a Thus, Simon
argues, "aggressive defense is justified because it subverts punishment
which, although formally prescribed, is unjustly harsh and
25. See Pearce, Republican Origins,supra note 7, at 249-56.
26. See generally Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEx. TECH L. REV.
1259 (1996); Thomas L. Shaffer, Should A Christian Lawyer Serve the Guilty?, 23 GA. L. REV.
1021 (1989).
27. Wendel, supra note 6, at 369-72.
28. See, e.g., LUBAN, supra note 2, at 33-35.
29. A symposium organized in honor of the publication of Simon's book contains many
thoughtful analyses of this theory from leading proponents of moralist approaches. See Symposium,
The Practice of Justice by William H. Simon, 51 STAN. L. REV. 867 (1999). Luban, writing as a socalled moralist under Wendel's classification scheme, argues that "[l]aw just isn't that good," and
that moral intuition must be applied in making ethical judgments. David Luban, Reason and
Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 888, 898 (1999). Thomas Shaffer, writing from the
perspective of religious ethics, suggests that notions of justice from religious perspectives are
"countercultural," in contrast to Simon's model derived from the dominant culture. Thomas L.
Shaffer, Should a Christian Lawyer Sign Upfor Simon's PracticeofJustice?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 903,
917 (1999). Tony Alfieri urges greater consideration of the need for lawyers to consider racial
justice in crafting their representational strategies. Anthony V. Alfieri, (Er)Race-ing an Ethic of
Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 935, 936 (1999). Finally, Robin West blasts Simon for his "romantic
conception of the invariable goodness of law, and the invariable illegality of injustice." Robin West,
The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51 STAN. L. REV. 973, 985
(1999).
30. See SIMON, supranote 3, at 149.
31. See id. at 189-90.
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discriminatory in terms of the more general norms of the legal culture, 32
just as aggressive representation of the welfare recipient client is
justified under broadly based legal norms not currently instantiated in
positive law. 33 Indeed, the key difference between Simon and the clinical
and postmodern legal ethics scholars he criticizes may amount to
about how broad these swaths of unjust law
nothing more than a dispute
34
system.
legal
our
in
are
Wendel, though also a legalist, has a somewhat different approach
to law, in that he sees its key purpose as serving a social coordination
function. Wendel argues that a lawyer should look to law as the
authoritative statement of how society has chosen to coordinate relations
among its members, and should seek to carry out those purposes in client
representations.3 5 Wendel's explanation is helpful and important so far
as it goes: To the extent that a lawyer is dealing with law that has this
social coordination function as its primary characteristic, there seems
little reason to object to Wendel's legal ethics model.
The difficulty with Wendel's approach arises with respect to the
many areas of law that have purposes different from or additional to
social coordination. Law, for example, dictates such matters as resource
distribution and allocations of other basic rights subsumed under the
concept of justice. In these areas, Wendel, like Simon, concedes that if
the fundamental justice of law is uncertain, a legal ethics stance different
from the one he proposes is necessary.36 In those problematic areas of
law, however broad (or not-a question I will leave to some other day),
an approach other than the legalists' is required. A legalist perspective
cannot work because in these areas we are not confident about the
fundamental justice of law and the results produced through its
operation. Significantly, these are the contexts about which poverty law
and clinical scholars tend to write, and it is thus no surprise that their
legal ethics models, derived from representation settings in which law's
fundamental justice may be in substantial doubt, are very different from
those of Simon and Wendel. Indeed, one piece of evidence that one may
be functioning in such a problematic area of the legal system is the
presence of obvious and substantial power imbalances among the parties
involved in a legal dispute. This is one reason why, in situations

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
See
See
See
See

id. at 148-49.
infra Part V.
Wendel, supra note 6, at 378-79.
id. at 405-24.
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involving such obvious and substantial power imbalances, client37 power
judgment.
should be a factor guiding lawyers' exercise of ethical
Justice-centered theorists who espouse substantive moralist bases
for legal ethics analysis often draw on communitarian theories to support
their positions. Their underlying jurisprudential assumptions thus differ
significantly from those of client-centered ethicists, who tend to view
law as involving an adversarial system of truth-testing, and thus
emphasize the importance of zealous advocacy of clients' positions
without regard for their justice in relation to the public interest or
communitarian
theorists'
good. 38 Justice-centered
community
perspective is reflected in their strong interest in the historical traditions
turn-of-the-twentieth-century
and
republicanism 39
civic
of
40 both of which assume the ability of actors to identify
progressivism,
and act in accordance with shared notions of the public interest. If
community good or public interest can be consensually or objectively
identified, as lawyers during these historical moments believed, then the
argument that lawyers should act with concern for the common good
foremost in mind in the course of representing clients is a strong one.
But if notions of community good or common interest are situated in
social context and widely disparate, then it becomes difficult to build a
theory of ethics on lawyers' obligation to act on the basis of their notions
of what justice requires. Such a theory ends up defensively dodging
challenges that it endorses the exercise of subjective judgment and the
elitist domination of lawyers over clients.
In short, moralists face critiques based in modem and post-modem
skepticism about the objectivity of such matters as truth, morality and
justice. Arguments that lawyers should do what they determine to be
"just" under the circumstances collapse into moral or legal relativism if
such determinations are subjective: In acting in the interests of justice,
lawyers will simply be following their own personal preferences or those
4
they hold by virtue of their social positions. 1 But even if justicecentered theorists' focus on lawyers' ability to ascertain correct
37.
38.

See infra Part Ill.
On adversarial legal ethics, see Wasserstrom, supra note 16, at 5-6; LUBAN, supra note 2,

at 82-83.
39. See, e.g., Pearce, Republican Origins, supra note 7, at 250-56; Gordon, Independence,
supra note 4, at 14-16.

40. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Comment, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The Decline of the
Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REv. 565, 565-71 (1985) (discussing Progressive Era lawyers as

embodying a better model of professional ideals).
41. Such arguments have been central in attacks on justice-centered views. See, e.g., Pepper,
supra note 14, at 617-18.
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substantive results on questions of legal interpretation or morality fails to
convince, it does not follow that their work has nothing to offer. To the
contrary, these theorists are very persuasive on the inadequacy of clientcentered legal ethics without more. As they point out, it surely cannot be
that lawyers, as officers of the legal system charged with upholding the
purposes of the law and the working of legal processes, need not concern
themselves with the effects of their representations on the system of law
and legal institutions in which they operate. It is at least clear that the
proper functioning of the legal system requires lawyers to act in such a
way as to preserve its continuing integrity and effectiveness. In other
words, even if lawyers should not impose their own views of substantive
justice on their clients, they surely have a duty to help protect the public
purposes of law and legal institutions. The challenge is to identify how
lawyers should do this without running into the epistemological
difficulties inherent in both moralist and legalist justice-centered
approaches.
2. Justice-Centered Ethics and Critical Theory
Simon was once a member of the critical legal studies movement,
and his work, emphasizing the discretion and indeterminacy built into
law, draws on some aspects of critical legal studies.42 But he is not a
comfortable fellow traveler with most of those who identify themselves
as critical theorists today.4 a Indeed, there is some irony in the fact that
Simon, an early "crit," should now insist that law provides the source of
determinate substantive dictates in legal ethics analysis. Simon
recognizes and addresses this irony in the following passage:
My friends and teachers in Critical Legal Studies devoted a good
deal of effort to extending the Realist critique of the objectivity of the
legal reasoning associated with judges and demonstrating the relative
"indeterminacy" of judicial doctrine. We thought that the mainstream
tendency to exaggerate objectivity and determinacy gave an

undeserved legitimacy to the work of the centrist/conservative

judiciary. We hoped that such critique would loosen things up for
Progressive politics.
42.

In The Practice of Justice, Simon relies almost exclusively on Ronald Dworkin's quite

different theory of flexible but determinate legal interpretation in Taking Rights Seriously. RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81-130 (1978) (discussing how judges reach correct results
in hard cases).
43. In some ways, of course, Simon clearly is a critical theorist, in light of his willingness to
challenge sacred assumptions and turn traditional analysis on its head. See, e.g., Note, Rethinking
the Professional Responsibilities of FederalAgency Lawyers, 115 HARv. L. REv. 1170, 1182 &

n.60 (2002) (calling Simon's legal ethics model a "critical model").
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I have always thought that this was an important and worthwhile
project, but it was apparent to me from the beginning that the situation
was quite different with lawyers' ethics. Here skepticism is the
and
mainstream tendency. Here it is the assertion of indeterminacy
quo.44
status
conservative
a
legitimate
to
subjectivity that serves
But the assertion of indeterminacy and subjectivity does not solely
characterize positions that seek to legitimate a conservative status quo.
Skepticism as a posture toward claims of justice in the context of legal
ethics analysis instead has multiple origins. The traditional one is based
on classical liberal justifications for adversarial, individual-rights
approaches to legal representation. Another, derived from critical theory,
arrives at similar conclusions from a very different starting point. It
locates the need for skepticism about moral truths and for restraint in a
lawyer's imposition of her own values on clients in a very different
understanding of the dangers and pervasiveness of power as a "force
45
field" bending well-meaning efforts away from conscious intent.
And Simon attributes the "indeterminacy and subjectivity"
approach to questions of justice to traditionalists who defend the status
quo,46 without acknowledging that justice-centered approaches similarly
support a flawed status quo characterized by paternalistic, lawyerdominated notions of public interest law. Scholars of the history of
public interest law have noted the ways in which elite public interest
lawyers have stood in the way of their clients' wishes and desires,
unreflective about the sometimes counterproductive effects of their own
47
socially situated perspectives on the development of those movements.
44. William H. Simon, The Legal and the Ethical in Legal Ethics: A Brief Rejoinder to
Comments on The Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REV. 991, 992 (1999) [hereinafter Simon,
Rejoinder].
45. On this Foucauldian notion of power as applied to lawyering analysis, see, for example,
Lucie E. White, Seeking "... the Faces of Otherness... ": A Response to Professors Sarat,

Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1501-02 (1992) [hereinafter White, Faces of
Otherness].
46. See Simon, Rejoinder, supranote 44, at 992.
47.

See generally Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's

Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445 (1996) (critiquing Brandeis's lack of engaged involvement with his
public interest clients); Norman W. Spaulding, The Myth of Civic Republicanism: Interrogatingthe
Ideology of Antebellum Legal Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397 (2003) (critiquing the way in
which civic republican models of lawyers' ethics ignore class dimensions of this professional
ideology); David B. Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes Strange
Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 147 (2002) (questioning motivations of patrician lawyers
involved in the early NAACP); Susan D. Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering:
Some HistoricalReflections, 9 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 81 (2001) (discussing benefits

and drawbacks of elite lawyers'
organizations).

involvement in two early national public interest law
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In all events, Simon, along with many other justice-centered
theorists, has been indifferent at best and hostile at worst to the virtues of
critical theory for legal ethics analysis. But some strains of critical legal
theory would seem to have useful application to questions about
lawyering in situations of substantial power imbalance, especially since
that is the political context on which critical theory tends to focus. It thus
seems well worth exploring the potential applicability of these strains of
critical theory to legal ethics doctrine. Again somewhat ironically, it is
theorists with client-centered legal ethics perspectives who have begun
to do this work.
B. Client-CenteredApproaches
Client-centered, zealous advocacy approaches to legal ethics
analysis have several origins. Again taking the 1970s as a somewhat
arbitrary starting point for a quick historical overview, one would point
to Charles Fried's classic article, The Lawyer as Friend, as the
paradigmatic traditional expression of this view.4 8 Monroe Freedman
defended a similar approach, focusing on the criminal defense context
but discussing corporate representation as well. 49 At around the same
time, civil rights and poverty lawyers were developing client-centered
theories of client representation from other angles.5 ° This work
developed still further after many former poverty movement lawyers
found homes in legal academia as clinicians, pioneering clinical legal
scholarship as an intellectual force that sought to pull legal academia's
focus more toward analyzing actual client representations.

48. Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend. The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client
Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1066 (1976).
49. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 20-21 (1975).

50. See, e.g., Edgar S. Cahn & Jean Camper Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession?The PublicInterest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1005, 1037 (1970) (emphasizing the
"current unresponsiveness of the political system to ethnic minorities," and arguing
for the
"development of a restructured legal system which is capable of meeting the mass demand for
justice by providing new remedies, new sources of redress, and new forums for the equitable
resolution of conflicts"); Stephen Wexler, PracticingLaw for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049,
1050 (1970) (arguing that the "law school model of personal legal problems" does not benefit
indigent clients because it does not take into account the unique circumstances of poverty); Gary
Bellow, Turning Solutions into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, NLADA BRIEFCASE, Aug.

1977, at 106 (discussing the inadequacies of the current Federal Legal Services Program and
making suggestions for improvements).
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1. Criminal Defense
All contemporary ethicists, including those in the justice-centered
tradition, agree that arguments for zealous client advocacy are most
51
persuasive in the criminal defense context. I suggest in Part IV that this
is because criminal defense presents the context where it is most
plausible to impose a strong presumption as to the potentially
overwhelming power of the state, pitted against a comparatively
powerless individual threatened with deprivation of life and liberty. But
Freedman and other legal ethicists writing about the criminal defense
context do not explicitly espouse context-specific analysis, and
sometimes make the same arguments about the importance of zealous
client advocacy in quite different practice settings, such as in lawyers'
representation of publicly traded corporations before the Securities and
Exchange Commission. 52 I will suggest that these scholars' key
analytical mistake in what is otherwise sound reasoning occurs here, in
assuming that an ethical stance developed in one practice context should
be transferred outside it.
2. The Clinical Scholarship Movement
Another line of client-centered ethics theory comes from the
clinical legal education movement's concern with legal ethics issues
arising in the representation of low-income clients. Such writing often
51. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 170-94 (presenting justifications for zealous advocacy in
the criminal defense context); Luban, supra note 8, at 1730 (arguing that the context of criminal
defense supports client-centered, zealous advocacy ethics stance).
52.

See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 20-24 (berating the SEC, in arguments

foreshadowing the corporate bar's indignation following enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, for
taking the position that lawyers should curtail the zeal of their advocacy in their representations of
clients before the Commission in order to safeguard the purposes of federal securities law). Other
scholars associated with criminal defense representation, including Charles Ogletree and Abbe
Smith, have similarly and persuasively defended the zealous advocacy model for the ethics of public
defenders. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175 (1984);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Century, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995); Ogletree, Beyond Justifications,supra note 1, at 1244-60. Smith, a
clinical law teacher closely associated with Freedman, frequently emphasizes the importance the
criminal defense context makes. See, e.g., Abbe Smith, The Difference in CriminalDefense and the
Difference It Makes, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 83 (2003) (arguing that the degree of zealous
representation appropriate in the context of criminal defense is different from civil cases in light of
many differences between these representational contexts); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The
Calling of CriminalDefense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 455-56 (1999) (making a special defense of
zealous advocacy on the part of public defenders, by noting that the majority of those accused of
crimes are poor people, the percentage of poor people among those convicted of crimes is even
greater, and the clients of criminal defense lawyers are also disproportionally nonwhite). But Smith,
too, sometimes asserts that the same principle of zealous advocacy should apply in all settings. See
Smith, supra, at 137.
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focuses on narratives involving the representation of disguised actual
clients, and seeks to capture and analyze the micro-dynamics of the
operation of power between lawyer and client. Classics include Lucie
White's iconic piece in which her client, Mrs. G., employs a far more
creative litigation strategy than that which White, then a legal services
lawyer, had advised.53 The case involved a hearing to determine whether
Mrs. G. had to return money received due to a welfare officer's
accidental overpayment of benefits. White's article analyzes the
complicated relations of power, race, class and gender between Mrs. G.,
the welfare department social worker responsible for the payment error
who was pursuing the hearing, and White, who had grown up in the
region but was very much set apart from the other actors in the story by
race, class privilege, law school education, and her power and authority
as an attorney.
The story's punch line involves Mrs. G.'s decision on the witness
stand to disregard White's advice and instead present a narrative about
her need to preserve her human dignity by buying Sunday shoes for her
children.54 After the hearing, the welfare department decided to drop the
case against Mrs. G., and White realized that she had failed to
understand, across lines of class, race, legal training and authority, her
client's perspective and wisdom in formulating a narrative or theory for
her case.
As the Mrs. G. study demonstrates, client-centered lawyering
literature seeks to deconstruct traditional assumptions about the ease
with which lawyers can ascertain and advocate for their clients'
interests. In noting the difficulties of lawyering across lines of class and
education and other axes of social difference, these scholars have forced
more sophistication in legal ethicists' awareness of the distinction
between zealous advocacy and client-centeredness. Client-centeredness
encompasses but does not stop at zealous advocacy; lawyers must also
strive to understand their clients' self-perceived interests, rather than
impose stock legalist viewpoints about what clients' interests in the
representation should be.
These scholars' case-study methodology also allows them to
closely examine the micro-dynamics of client-centered counseling.
Clinical scholars describe a collaborative interaction between client and
lawyer. They insist that client-centered representation involves neither
simply accepting the client's statement of goals and interests as
53. See White, supra note 1, at 21-32 (telling Mrs. G.'s story.).
54. ld. at 31.
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articulated at the outset of a representation, nor imposing one's own
views of the goals and interests the client should wish to pursue. Instead,
client-centered counseling at its best involves an exchange of
information, knowledge and perspectives between client and lawyer,
from which both parties and the quality of the legal representation gain.
Key to this dialogic process, however, is the ultimate right of the client
to decide on both the goals and the means used in the legal
representation. 55 Thus, client-centered theorists insist, in the end, if client
and lawyer fail to see eye-to-eye after such reciprocal dialogue, it is the
client's wishes that should prevail.56 Clinical scholars have identified
many reasons why client-centeredness is appropriate in their practice
context; 57 an important one is that it preserves the relative power of the
client in relation to the lawyer, whose position of relative social privilege
58
could otherwise easily lead to domination over the client.
3. Rebellious or Community Lawyering
Another strain of client-centered lawyering theory that arises out of,
but in some ways sets itself apart from, the classic client-centered
lawyering literature, goes by the name of rebellious or community
59
lawyering. Advocates of this approach, including Gerald L6pez, Lucie
White60 and many others,6 ' have developed models of client55. See, e.g., Dinerstein, supra note 1, at 547-49.
56. See, e.g., Pepper, supra note 14, at 616; FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 31 (arguing that the
lawyer should attempt to talk the client out of committing perjury on the witness stand in a criminal
case, but ultimately should not disclose the perjury or withdraw from the case if the client fails to
follow the lawyer's counsel).
57. See, e.g., Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of Client-Centered
Representation, 12 CLINICAL L. REV. 369, 377-79 (2006) (identifying many reasons for clientcentered representation); Dinerstein, supranote 1, at 511-56 (same).
58. See Kruse, supranote 57, at 377-78.
59.

GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE

LAW PRACTICE 28-38 (1992) (arguing that lawyers for the subordinated must embrace the
"rebellious idea of lawyering against subordination"); Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2 (1984) (suggesting that lawyering means solving human problems through an activity
characterized as "lay lawyering"-the things a person does to help another solve a problem); Gerald
P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious
Collaboration,77 GEO. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) (advocating lawyering against subordination by
"work[ing] with, not just on behalf of, subordinated people"); Gerald P. L6pez, The Work We Know
So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1989) (promoting a "joint effort at fighting political and
social subordination" between low-income minority women and attorneys).
60. See Lucie E. White, CollaborativeLawyering in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from
Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 160 (1994) [hereinafter White, Collaborative
Lawyering] (examining "opportunities for collaborative lawyering work on a local level"); Lucie E.
White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV.
699, 700-01 (suggesting that the methods used by a lawyer, an organizer, and a South African
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centeredness that focus on understanding poor or otherwise
disadvantaged clients in the context of their communities.62 Rebellious
and community-based lawyering theorists also emphasize exploration of
creative lawyering strategies and the breaking down of distinctions
between lawyering and community organizing techniques. What makes
supporters of this approach similar to classic client-centered lawyering
theorists is their focus on relatively powerless or disadvantaged clients,
communities, and interests, and their insistence that lawyers should seek
to refrain from dominating their clients and instead should strive to help
client communities discover and pursue their interests as they perceive
them.
Simon has critiqued these genres of legal ethics scholarship on a
number of grounds, some of which have merit but some of which do not.
Simon notes, for example-correctly, to my mind-that the clinical
client-centered lawyering literature has many elements that are similar to
the traditional client autonomy view. 63 He also argues-again correctly,
to my mind-that clinical legal scholarship can become too exclusively
focused on the micro-dynamics of client-lawyer interactions at the
expense of important broader questions about effective strategies for
community in resisting aggression by the South African government should be the model for
change-oriented lawyering).
61. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 450 (2001) (evaluating the role of the "law and organizing
model" in progressive legal practice); Michael Diamond, Community Lawyering: Revisiting the Old
Neighborhood, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67, 73 (2000) (proposing a model of lawyering in
which attorneys working in a community setting take on "tasks that are designed to solve problems
and to empower clients"); Shauna I. Marshall, Mission Impossible?: Ethical Community Lawyering,
7 CLINICAL L. REV. 147, 153 (2000) (stating that community lawyering has "great possibilities for
addressing certain legal, political, economic and social problems facing impoverished
communities"); Jane C. Murphy, Lawyering for Social Change: The Power of the Narrative in
Domestic Violence Law Reform, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1993) (supporting the integration
of story-telling with law reform efforts to effect social change); William P. Quigley, Reflections of
Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U.
L. REV. 455, 456 (1994) (proposing that lawyers for community organizations consider the insights
of community organizers in developing their approaches to lawyering).
62. See generally LOPEZ, supra note 59 (describing various perspectives to public interest law
practice and choosing community lawyering as the best); Christine Zuni Cruz, [On the] Road Back
In: Community Lawyering in Indigenous Communities, 5 CLINICAL L. REV. 557 (1999) (describing
community lawyering in the context of Cruz's return to her Native American community); Victor
M. Hwang, The Hmong Campaign for Justice: A Practitioner's Perspective, 9 ASIAN L.J. 83, 87
(2002) (describing creative organizing and lawyering techniques in campaign to win the Hmong
people rights to welfare benefits). See also Diamond, supra note 61, at 100; 147-48; White,
Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 60, at 158.
63. Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 21, at 1104, 1111-12 ("[T]he client 'empowerment'
recommended by the new scholarship seems quite similar to the client autonomy exalted in the
traditional doctrine.").
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political change. 64 But he incorrectly asserts that these scholars deny that
lawyers exercise ethical discretion in lawyering and claim they can
refrain from imposing any values or power in their client relationships.6 5
That is far from what these scholars claim; their project instead is to
reflect on and develop better ethical practices in order to guide the
exercise of their power and discretion. Nor does it follow from the valid
aspects of Simon's critique that poverty law scholars' general ethics
project is illegitimate: Surely close reflective analysis of how ethical
discretion operates in lawyer relationships with poor clients can help in
the development of ethical norms appropriate to this practice context.
Simon correctly observes that post-modem theory has strongly
influenced some scholars affiliated with the client-centered and
rebellious lawyering movements and that this influence is in part
responsible for the movements' drastic scaling down of their political
ambitions.66 But to say that the lawyering theory of the poverty law
movement has become too focused on micro-dynamics at the expense of
theorizing strategies for broader-scale political change is not to say that
it is not political at all. Critical lawyering theorists do not see
representation of relatively powerless clients as merely providing
"psychological" therapy; their hope is that lawyering interactions present
small-scale moments of possible client empowerment. 67 This idea stems
from post-modernists' claims that the micro-dynamics of power's
operation in the flux and confusion of local, particular situations creates
opportunities for resistance and change.6 8 Their underlying faith
64. Id. at 1100 ("The scale of practice portrayed is typically small--often one on one-and
the benefits are often as much psychological as they are material. At each stage in this remarkable
evolution, the concern with lawyer oppression of clients has increased, while the scale of material
and organizational ambitions has declined.").
65.

Seeid at 1100-01.

66. Many commentaries on the politics of post-modernism have made similar critiques about
its lack of political thrust. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Cross-Dressingin the Master's Clothes, 109
YALE L.J. 745, 774 (2000) (reviewing JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND
WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000)) (critiquing the concept of politics as

involving subversive repetition) (citation omitted); Joel F. Handler, Postmodernism, Protest,and the
New Social Movements, 26 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 697, 719-28 (1992) (criticizing the focus of
postmodemist activism on local disruptions that fail to produce sustained, large-scale political
change).
67.

See Simon, Dark Secret, supra note 21, at 1100.

68. See, e.g., White, Faces of Otherness, supra note 45, at 1501-05 (applying late-twentieth
century social theory to a micro-analysis of lawyering). Or, as Lrpez writes:
[P]ower-the capacity to make things the way we want them-isn't something only
some people have.... Power necessarily runs in all directions within relationships. No
person, no group is ever absolutely powerless in any relationship, not battered women
and not low-income people of color in the East Bay. In fact, when we call a person or a
group "subordinated" or "victimized," we're always describing a state of relative

19

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:115

commitment is that the development, through reflective analysis, of an
ethics of respect and restraint will produce better client-lawyer
interactions-i.e., ones more likely to lead to effective large-scale
political action-than 69ones in which lawyers unduly and unreflectively
dominate their clients.
A second contribution post-modernism offers legal ethics theory is
a wariness about the effects of power relationships in shaping actors'
socially constructed consciousness. Recognizing the insidious and
pervasive operation of power and ideology in all facets of social
interaction, post-modem lawyering theorists are particularly suspicious
of claims to know the common good. Those claims are tainted byindeed pervaded by-the interests of the dominant class. 70 In this respect
post-modernism as applied to legal ethics analysis produces results more
like traditional liberalism's emphasis on the need for zealous client
advocacy than like those stemming from the strains of
communitarianism
that support justice-centered
legal ethics
perspectives. Post-modernism is skeptical of claims to know a common
good that stands apart from political struggle. It is also deeply doubtful
about the possibilities for progress or lack of co-optation in that political
struggle between the more and the less powerful. But it sees that struggle
going on all the time, in the many interstices and contested local
powerlessness. For all that they endure, battered women and low-income people of color
still retain the capacity to work rebelliously with both stock and improvised stories-the
capacity to resist victimization and subordination and to reverse its tendencies.
... Granted, no one is weaponless in a power struggle. But some of us have tanks
and some of us only rocks.
We cannot escape the exercise of power either, certainly not through law and not
even through love.

To help us remember how our everyday lawyering is inescapably a part of the power
we all inevitably exercise, try picturing ... social life as networks of competing power
strategies. Think of every social situation as the convergence of particular power
strategies.
... Along with the many informal strategies we daily use, law provides more formal
strategies to understand and shape our relationships.
LtPEZ, supranote 59, at 41-43.
69. I have attempted to begin to think about a legal ethics model based on respect and
restraint in the context of lawyering for public interest law movements in Susan D. Carle, How
Should We Theorize Class Interests in Thinking About ProfessionalRegulation?: The Early NAACP
as a Case Example, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 571, 572 (2003).
70. Thus, even Wilkins, hardly a radical post-modernist, skeptically suggests that elite
lawyers involved in the practice of public interest law are in fact doing nothing more than
perpetuating the long term interests of their own dominant economic class. See Wilkins, supra note
47, at 149-51.
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battlegrounds of daily social life. Lawyers whose legal ethics
perspectives are influenced by these strains of critical theory strive to
take part in that struggle on the side of the less powerful. Their legal
ethics literature is based on these post-modernist-influenced
understandings---on developing principles that help make those sites in
which lawyers participate in political struggle more about resistance to
entrenched forms of power and less about perpetuating the domination
of those with power and privilege, including lawyers, over those with
relatively few such resources. As an aspiration, that idea surely has
much merit as one aspect of the development of a legal ethics analysis
suitable for lawyering across social differences and on behalf of those
with the least social advantage.
In short, in contrast to Simon, I view the literature developed out of
the poverty law and clinical legal education movements as largely on the
right track in focusing on how to enhance client perspectives and
empowerment in the context of lawyering relationships with persons,
groups, and interests with little social, economic, political, or legal
power. The key challenge, however, is to reconcile this view of lawyers'
appropriate ethics stance with justice-centered theorists' convincing
showing of the potential harm overly aggressive client advocacy can do
to the public interest. My argument is that a key aspect of that
reconciliation requires embracing legal ethics approaches with emphases
that differ depending on practice location.
4. Corporate Representation
Thus far, I have described client-centered legal ethics theory that
arises out of practice contexts involving the representation of relatively
powerless individuals and communities. My description has not covered
the entire territory, however; some prominent spokespersons for clientcentered lawyering write from the context of corporate representation.7'
But these traditionalists represent the old guard. Public policy trends
away from strict lawyer confidentiality in the face of serious danger to
the public interest, and toward greater lawyer activism in investigating
and correcting wrongdoing by organizational clients, suggest that the
course of legal ethics regulation is sweeping past these commentators'

71. See generally, e.g., Larry Fox, The Falloutfrom Enron: Media Frenzy and Misguided
Notions of Public Relations Are No Reason to Abandon Our Commitment to Our Clients, in
ADVANCED SECURITIES LAW WORKSHOP 867 (2002) (defending client-centered corporate

lawyering in the wake of Enron).
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objections.72 Arguments for zealous client advocacy on behalf of
enormously powerful corporations fail to pack the persuasive punch they
once did in light of successive waves of corporate scandals in which
lawyers played a significant role. It has simply become increasingly hard
to explain how the proper overall working of the legal system is
enhanced when lawyers for savings and loan companies stonewall
federal regulators so that investors lose billions more before their clients'
insolvency and financial mismanagement is uncovered, or approve sham
transactions and then engage in a pitifully inadequate internal
investigation of a whistleblower's misconduct charges, as was the case
in the course of the events leading to the collapse of Enron.73 In all of
these scandals, a key aspect of the lawyers' conduct that commentators
later found objectionable involved adherence to a strongly clientcentered, zealous advocacy ethics stance. Yet in most instances these
lawyers' actions failed to cross the line beyond the conduct permitted
under legal ethics rules.74 These scandals have thus exacerbated the
crisis of confidence about the effectiveness of current client-centered
models of legal ethics regulation. As many leading legal ethics scholars
have persuasively argued in their autopsies of these and other corporate
scandals, the time for context-specific approaches to lawyer regulation
has arrived. 7

72. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2006) (providing discretion for
lawyers to disclose client confidences where the lawyer reasonably believes it necessary to "prevent
reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;" to "prevent the client from committing a crime
or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property
of another" if the lawyer's services were used; or "to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury"
to the same interests in the same circumstances), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)
(2002) (defining stricter mandatory duties of confidentiality that only allowed lawyers to disclose
client confidences "to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary" to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in "reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm.") (emphasis added). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2002));
SEC Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. § 205 (2003)
(imposing disclosure, reporting, and investigative obligations on lawyers representing publicly
traded companies).
73. See, e.g., Gordon, New Role, supra note 8, at 1190-1207 (outlining excuses for the
lawyers involved in the Enron scandal and discussing the ultimate inadequacies of those excuses).
74. See William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the
Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 248-51, 265 (1998)
[hereinafter Simon, Kaye Scholer] (describing in detail the charges the Office of Thrift Supervision
filed against Kaye Scholer and the New York court's dismissal of them).
75. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1149-60 (1993) (using Kaye Scholer as an example of the need
for context-specific regulation).
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POWER AS A FACTOR IN LAWYERS' ETHICAL DELIBERATIONS

The Importance of Discretion in Lawyers'EthicalJudgment

The Savings and Loan and Enron scandals helped focus attention
on the fact that lawyers continually exercise discretionary ethical
judgment in their client representations; the positive prescriptions legal
ethics rules supply cannot determine by themselves what lawyers can or
should do in all instances. Indeed, one of Simon's many important
contributions to legal ethics study is his insight into the important role
discretion plays in lawyers' ethical judgment. 76 Simon persuasively
argues that such discretion operates continuously and unavoidably in all
lawyers' practice decisions.
That positive law lacks determinacy is by no means a new insight,
of course. As H.L.A. Hart convincingly established long ago, positive
law is always rife with gaps and ambiguities that require the application
of discretionary judgment.77 This is particularly the case with regard to
legal ethics rules, which regulators have drafted to apply across the
entire profession. These rules are often purposely left broad so as to
provide general guidelines that can be adapted to the particularities of
disparate practice settings. It is this indeterminacy in the positive dictates
of ethics law that left lawyers in the Savings and Loan and Enron
scandals to operate within a zone of discretion in which their general
normative orientation toward zealous client-centeredness, rather than
limits set by the rules, dictated their conduct. For the same reason,
regulators were unable to successfully prosecute these lawyers for
violations of legal ethics law; they were unable to show that these
lawyers' conduct went beyond the wide bounds set by the law regulating
lawyers' conduct.7 8

76. Simon's insight follows from the legal realists' investigation of the important role
discretion plays in law practice generally. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and the Social SciencesEspecially Sociology, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1296-97 (1949) (discussing the important role of
discretion in law practice). No one ever talks about Llewellyn as a legal ethicist, but a good
argument can be made that he is the first great one in the legal realist tradition pursued by William
Simon-as when Llewellyn writes about the importance of socializing legal actors into habits of
mind that will lead them to exercise discretion wisely. See, e.g., id at 1293.
77. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-50 (1961) (discussing rule-skepticism).
78. Thus legal ethics regulators failed to successfully prosecute the lawyers involved in either
of these egregious cases on ethics misconduct charges. These lawyers' conduct, though arguably
over the lines set by the rules in some instances, did not in the main violate the positive dictates of
the ethics rules with sufficient clarity to result in legal penalty. See Simon, Kaye Scholer, supra note
74, at 253-58.

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:115

Thus a key aspect of reforming lawyers' conduct requires a shift in
lawyers' general normative orientation, rather than mere altered
prescriptions contained in legal ethics rules themselves. Following
Simon and others who seek to propose new approaches to legal ethics
analysis, I will focus in this Article primarily on this dimension of
lawyers' discretionary judgment. In other words, I am seeking to carve
the dimensions and defend the general principle of a contextual approach
that looks for factors that should guide lawyers' ethical deliberation,
rather than undertaking at this point to propose new rules. The general
principles I explore here certainly could lead to revisions in the ethics
rules as well, but that focus must await a future project.7 9
It also bears emphasizing that my argument in favor of lawyers'
consideration of relative client power in their discretionary ethical
judgment is not that lawyers should abandon rules against breaking the
law, falsifying evidence, suborning perjury, or any of a number of other
limits, but instead focuses on ethics analysis within limits that are
appropriate in all contexts. Put otherwise, the argument that lawyers
should consider power as a factor in ethics analysis does not propose that
lawyers should disregard the boundaries set by law and professional
conduct rules, but address the (often quite large) area of bounded
discretion in which normative orientation guides decisions in the

79. Indeed, a power-based approach ultimately does call for a rethinking and restructuring of
the Model Rules. In their current form, the Model Rules openly acknowledge the fundamental
tension between client- and justice-centeredness and strike a balance between these two poles. For
example, provisions of Article I of the Model Rules, addressing the "Client-Lawyer Relationship,"
embrace the client-centered and non-accountability views, as when Rule 1.2 states that lawyers are
to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation," MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2006), and that a lawyer's representation "does not constitute an
endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or activities." MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2006). Other Articles provide the counterweight of lawyers' justiceoriented duties-to the court, third parties, and the public interest. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2006) (Candor Toward the Tribunal); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2006) (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT art. 4 (Transactions with Persons Other Than Clients); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT art. 6 (2006) (Public Service). On balance, the rules are weighted toward clientcenteredness within bounds. Ajustice-centered view, if codified generally, could require revision of
many specific provisions, including, but not limited to, modifying Rule 1.2 and expanding Article 6,
in order to shift this overall balance away from client-centeredness and toward justice-focused
duties to the court and to the public interest. A power-based approach, as a third alternative, would
embrace this shift in some contexts but would retain, and perhaps even strengthen, the clientcentered balance of the current rules for other practice contexts. A detailed examination of how this
would work must await another paper, however; for now my primary interest is in focusing on how
a power-based analysis would apply as a matter of general principle.
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everyday ethical choices, both large and small, that confront practicing
80
lawyers.

In this area of bounded discretion, my proposal for consideration of
relative client power in resolving close ethical judgment calls would
work as follows: Lawyers for clients with substantially greater power
relative to that of other interests affected by the representation should
strive to temper the zealousness of their client advocacy with an eye to
protecting consideration of less powerful interests. In contrast, lawyers
for clients with substantially less power-in other words, lawyers
representing "underdogs" vis d vis powerful interests-should be guided
by the ethical principle of zealous, client-centered representation. In the
middle range of cases, involving representations of clients with
substantially equivalent power, or power relationships that are
sufficiently complex or multifaceted as to produce indeterminate results
under a power-based test, consideration of relative client power should
not come into play in guiding lawyers' ethical judgments. Thus, as I
discuss further in Part IV below, my proposal for consideration of
relative client power as a factor in legal ethics analysis applies only to
some representations, involving obvious and substantial power
imbalances among affected interests, and leaves the rest of the terrain to
other ethics theories. But as I hope I have illustrated here in Part II, the
disagreement between the justice- and client-centered theorists arises
precisely because advocates of each approach are writing with a focus
on the disparate practice settings of corporate and individual client
representation respectively, where power imbalances tend to be the most
salient. Before discussing through concrete hypotheticals how contextspecific ethics norms focused on relative client power would work,
however, I make the case for why client power should make a difference
at all.
B.

Why FactorClient Power into Lawyers'EthicalJudgments?

The preliminary question presented is, why should relative client
power make a difference to legal ethics analysis? I consider four
possible reasons why this should be so. In doing so, I consider the
jurisprudential bases for client-centered legal ethics in traditional liberal
theory and the understandings of the importance of power in legal and
political processes developed by both liberal and critical legal theorists. I
80. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting
Context in Legal Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 68-70 (Austin Sarat et
al. eds., 1998).
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also examine the assumptions that underlie the widely held consensus,
shared by client- and justice-centered theorists alike, that the legal ethics
principles applicable to criminal defense representation are and should
be different. Finally, I point out the way in which considering client
power, rather than assessing the underlying "justice" of particular cases,
avoids some of the critiques that have been leveled against justicecentered ethics theories.
1. The Representation Reinforcement Function of Zealous
Advocacy
As many legal ethics scholars have noted, the legal ethics norm of
zealous, client-centered advocacy has its origins in classical liberal
jurisprudence. 8 John Rawls, the leading contemporary spokesperson for
liberal political theory, describes its main task as theorizing the rules for
82
a just and fair society under conditions of irresolvable pluralism.
Different citizens hold incommensurable comprehensive doctrines and
this incommensurability of world views cannot be resolved.83 This claim
of irresolvable pluralism provides an important rationale for clientcentered, zealous advocacy legal ethics models. If no one has the upper
hand in determining what constitutes justice, then the testing of clients'
positions through zealous advocacy appears to be the only way to
determine "just" results.84
In any event, as Rawls further states, the task for liberal political
theory is to determine the rules or procedures to which citizens would
agree for the just and fair operation of public institutions under these
conditions of irresolveable pluralism. 85 One method of determining rules
for the operation of fair and just public institutions involves application
of the difference principle. That principle holds that rules are just to the
extent that they would be agreed to from the hypothetical "original
position"-i.e., before persons knew about their relative advantages or
disadvantages in the conditions of their actual lives-and that the rules
that would be agreed to from this hypothetical original position are those
81.

See, e.g., Wasserstrom, supra note 16.

82. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 31 (1999) [hereinafter RAWLS, THE LAW].
83. See Erin Kelly, Editor's Forward to JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A
RESTATEMENT, at xi (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter RAWLS, JUSTICE] ("Under the political and

social conditions of free institutions, we encounter a plurality of distinct and incompatible
doctrines .... Political liberalism acknowledges and responds to this 'fact of reasonable pluralism'
by showing how a political conception can fit into various and even conflicting comprehensive
doctrines ...").
84. See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
85.

See RAWLS, THE LAW, supra note 82, at 31-32.
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that make the least advantaged persons better off than they otherwise
would be.86 Advantage or disadvantage is measured according to
persons' access to "primary goods," or those "conditions and all-purpose
means" generally necessary to allow citizens to pursue human
87
flourishing and their diverse conceptions of the good.
Rawls is careful to emphasize that these conditions apply only to
the operation of public institutions, but it seems fairly clear that one such
institution for Rawls is the legal system.8 8 Whether for Rawls the rules
governing lawyers' conduct within the legal system would similarly be
89
subject to the basic principles of justice is less clear; Rawls never
writes at this level of specificity or application, and it would take me too
far away from the central purpose of this Article to attempt such an
90
application. It suffices that access to justice is a primary good. Under
the difference principle, rules that promote less advantaged citizens'
access to justice are to be favored over those that do not. A rule that
grants less advantaged clients access to justice through the provision of
zealous, client-centered advocacy fits well, in general terms, within the
difference principle approach. Zealous, client-centered advocacy for the
least advantaged members of society provides enhanced access to justice
for them and in this way enhances the overall fairness of the public
institution of law.
Other general principles of liberalism similarly support clientcentered ethics principles within a framework sensitive to substantial
power imbalances. 91 One of these, inherited from John Stuart Mill,
involves the principle that all, even the most disadvantaged, be permitted
to compete in the marketplace of ideas. 92 The legal system, as a site in
that marketplace, offers a forum in which voices or perspectives can
86.

See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 42-43.

87. Id. at 57.
88. See RAWLS, THE LAW, supra note 82, at 134 (noting that ideas of public reason apply
most strictly to the discourse and decision of judges).

89. Those rules may instead best be classified as those that apply to transactions between
individuals and associations. See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 54. On the debate about the
scope of the basic structure and the extent to which it should include rules that regulate relations
among individuals, see, for example, Symposium, Rawls and the Law, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1381
(2004).
90. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 118, 124 (2003) (defining access to justice as a key component of fundamental fairness

of our legal system).
91.

See RAWLS, JUSTICE, supra note 83, at 140 (noting that many methods of deciding on

rules for fair play within public institutions are available).
92.

See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 53-54 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g

Co. 1978) (1859) (discussing the need for a robust exchange of ideas to challenge unreliable
orthodoxies).
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compete in the development of public reason. But if only some voices
have the power to compete, there is no such free marketplace-ideas are
competing based on the power of the voice, not the merits of the ideas.
Contemporary liberal jurisprudence, then, supports the idea of zealous
advocacy within the legal system on issues of public policy to the extent
of amplifying voices so that all can be adequately heard, but not the
further amplification through aggressive legal representation of already
strong voices so that they drown out those with less volume. 93 This is a
second representation reinforcement reason for providing the least
advantaged members of society with zealous, client-centered legal
advocates.
These two general ideas are embedded in contemporary models of
public interest law.94 Those models, which appear to have first arisen in
the context of the poverty law movement of the 1970s, set themselves
against earlier Progressive-Era models for public interest lawyering that
were based on notions of promoting the public interest detached from
the perspectives of particular clients. 95 In contrast to these earlier
traditions, the 1970s poverty-law model defined public interest law as
giving voice to members of groups under-represented in the political
process and underprivileged in terms of economic and social resources
96
and benefits.
These ideas, in turn, connect with legal ethics prescriptions.
Zealous, client-centered representation makes sense as an ethics model
where it is directed at amplifying the voices of those whose voices are
not as loud. But the same rationale does not apply to the amplification
through zealous advocacy of the voices of those whose voices are
93. Similar arguments can be made within the framework of classical pragmatism's concern
about creating the conditions for participatory democracy. See, e.g., Susan D. Carle, Theorizing
Agency, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 307, 360-62 (2005) (discussing Dewey's concern about creating the
conditions for participatory democracy by empowering all voices with the skills and mindset
necessary to engage in deliberative processes).
94. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, supra note 50, at 1006-07 (1970) (arguing that public interest law
should confine itself to representing the poor and disenfranchised).
95. For a more extensive discussion of this contrast between early twentieth century and
contemporary ideas about public interest law, see Carle, supra note 12, at 732-40.
96. According to an often-quoted definition:
Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal
representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been
undertaken in recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal services fails to provide
such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such
groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic
minorities, and others.
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976).
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already strong. A liberal jurisprudence conceived along these lines thus
supports the idea of client-centered ethics within bounds, with the degree
of zealousness of lawyers' representation of clients tempered by
concerns about the representation reinforcement function of lawyers'
advocacy.
Of course, it is not always the case that legal representation of less
advantaged members of society involves giving voice to perspectives or
interests that should be heard in order to further public reason. The
representation enforcement idea does not, for example, support the
notion of zealous advocacy for the acquittal and release into the
community of an impecunious serial murderer. Thus the principle of
representation reinforcement can do some work in explaining why client
power should be a factor in lawyers' ethics analysis in situations of
substantial power imbalance, but it cannot fully explain why a client's
relative power disadvantage should entitle him or her to zealous, clientcentered advocacy. Here other liberal jurisprudential considerations must
also come into play. Those principles appear to reside primarily in
liberal jurisprudential assumptions about the inherent value and dignity
of individuals. In the case of legal representation of the murderer, liberal
jurisprudential principles posit that the murderer has dignitary and
liberty rights that deserve protection against state power, separate from
the political considerations that support vigorous advocacy of excluded
voices on legal-political issues of public concern.
2. Liberalism's Concern for the Dignitary Rights of Individuals
The liberal emphasis on the dignitary rights of individuals thus
forms another important, but not unbounded, justification for clientcentered advocacy in some, but not all, representation contexts. It
provides a key aspect of the justification for zealous advocacy in the
criminal defense context. In Freedman's words,
Under our adversary system, the interests of the state are not absolute,
or even paramount. The dignity of the individual is respected to the
point that even when the citizen is known by the state to have
committed a heinous offense, the individual is nevertheless accorded
and the privilege
such rights as counsel, trial
97 by jury, due process,
against self-incrimination.
In other words, the constitutional protections and zealous advocacy
accorded defendants in criminal trials aim at a purposeful tipping or

97.

FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 2.
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"unleveling" of the playing field in this representation context. The
standard justification for creating this unlevel playing field in criminal
cases is that the state has enormous potential power and the criminal
defendant has relatively little.9 8 In order to create such an unlevel
playing field, the Rules assign different role-specific responsibilities to
prosecutors and defense counsel. The prosecutor is to attend to the
"justice" of her case, while defense counsel is to represent her client
with the maximum zealousness permitted within the rules. The value of
protecting individual dignity and rights against the potentially
overwhelming force of the state justifies the lack of reciprocity in the
ethical obligations owed by lawyers on the two sides. There is no reason
why the same justifications based on substantial disparities in client
power should not also apply in defining lawyers' respective ethical
considerations in civil matters that similarly have profound effects on
clients' interests.
3. The Fallacy of Granting Natural Status to Corporations
The foundation of client-centered legal ethics principles in
liberalism's emphasis on the value of individuals also illuminates the
fallacy of applying client-centered ethics to the representation of clients
who are not individuals at all, but are instead legal fictions masquerading
as natural entities by virtue of the constitutive power of law. Liberal
ideas concerning the primacy of the rights of natural persons have no
place in the context of representing entities lacking natural status. This is
not only because organizations may possess enormous power, but also
because they are not individuals at all. To be sure, organizations are
granted the status of persons for some legal purposes, but only as a
convenient fiction. 99 This fiction works for some purposes but not all,
and there is no inherent reason why the fiction should apply in legal
ethics analysis. Indeed, the objections of many liberal legal theorists to
the lack of restrictions on the "free speech" rights of corporations in the
context of political campaigns °0 can be applied with equal force to rules

98.

See discussion supra Part II.B.I.

99.

For critical accounts of the historical development of this legal fiction, see, for example,

Morton J. Horowitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L.
REV. 173, 173 (1985); Mark M. Hager, Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational
"Real Entity" Theory, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1989) (further developing Horowitz's

work).
100. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Oct.
17, 1996, at 19 (describing why "money is the biggest threat to the democratic process"); Jeffrey
Nesteruk, Bellotti and the Question of Corporate Moral Agency, 1988 COLUM. BuS. L. REV. 683,
683-84 (arguing that the Supreme Court's analysis of First Amendment rights of corporations
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that fail to restrict the zealousness of lawyers' promotion of
corporations' interests in the legal arena. Limiting client-centered ethics
based in liberal jurisprudence to its core concern with the dignity and
equality of individuals avoids the error of applying this concept to the
very different context of representing entities that are no more than a
creation of law and thus justifiably constrained by it. This prescription
returns a legal ethics analysis based in liberal jurisprudence back to its
concern with the dignity and equality of individuals and corrects the
error of applying an orientation appropriate to the representation of
relatively powerless individuals fighting against the power of the state to
the very different context of corporate legal representation.
The context of corporate representation is different from the context
of individual client representations for another reason as well-namely,
because very different moral hazards typically exist in the context of
10 In the
large corporation versus individual client representations.
context of representing powerful clients, such as large corporations,
lawyers' incentive is to do too much for their clients; in the context of
representing individual clients, who typically-but not 10always-have
too little. 2
relatively little power, lawyers' incentive is to do
4. Correcting for the Moral Hazards of Self-Interest
Thus a fourth argument for why relative client power should play a
role in lawyers' ethical deliberations involves the importance of
promoting an ethical principle that most precisely and directly pushes
against the differential moral hazards presented in disparate practice
locations. An ethics norm that calls on lawyers to stay their hands or
temper their representations when representing clients with relatively
substantial power asks lawyers to be conscious and wary of the way in
which self-interest may affect ethical judgment. Where strong client
pressure exists to steamroll an overwhelmed opponent or stonewall a
regulatory agency with limited resources, an ethical norm that requires
lawyers to resist the effects of client power serves as a counterweight to
the influences that may lead to over-aggressive client representation. On
ignores corporations' lack of status as moral agents); Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal
Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 273, 277 (1993) (arguing that the
law's failure to control the enormous influence of corporate wealth on the political process violates
constitutional one person/one vote principles); Carl E. Schneider, Free Speech and Corporate
Freedom: A Comment on First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1227, 125269 (1986) (criticizing the Supreme Court's reasoning in comparing corporate free speech rights to
those of natural individuals).
101. See Wilkins, supra note 8, at 816-18.
102. See id at 832-33.
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the other hand, where lawyers are representing relatively poor or
disadvantaged clients, the typical moral hazard produced by self-interest
is to do too little in light of clients' inability to pay for superior services.
In this practice context, a norm that insists on zealous, client-centered
advocacy corrects for the tug of self-interest that might otherwise lead
lawyers to skimp on the quality of representation or devotion to their
client. In sum, correction of moral hazard problems provides a strong
and comprehensive justification for considering relative client power in
formulating context-specific legal ethics priorities.
The objection can be raised, of course, that lawyers will not follow
a power-based approach precisely because it too directly contravenes the
tug of self-interest. Just as it contravenes lawyers' financial self-interest
to give zealous, client-centered representation to poor people who cannot
afford to pay for such extraordinary devotion, it also contravenes
lawyers' business interests to temper their representations with concern
about the public interest in representing powerful corporate clients that
can easily take their business elsewhere if they are not satisfied with the
aggressiveness of the representation they receive. But these objections
can be made about any legal ethics principle. The very reason some legal
questions about lawyers' conduct are labeled "ethics" issues is that they
require professional conduct other than that which self-interest readily
motivates. 103 Although it may be hard to convince some lawyers to
engage in a power-based approach to the exercise of discretionary
ethical judgment, it is difficult to convince lawyers to abide by other
ethics principles as well. The problem of lawyers' self-interest should
not be a reason to refrain from the development of principles that have
the most appropriate fit in relation to the objectives of ethics analysis.
5. Avoiding Lawyer Domination of Clients
A final reason for introducing considerations of relative client
power into lawyers' ethics analysis relates to the problems inherent in
pure justice-centered approaches to the extent that they call on lawyers
to impose their own substantive values on clients who cannot resist such
lawyer domination. As discussed in Part II above, critics of justicecentered theories have argued that calls on lawyers to impose their
103. Indeed, as a large amount of sociological literature has postulated, the "professions" may
be distinguished from mere business activity precisely by virtue of the existence of ethical norms
that check temptations to succumb to moral hazards in the provision of services whose quality it is
difficult for lay persons to assess. See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social
Structure, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34, 43-46 (rev. ed. 1954) (contrasting ethics norms
of business and professions).
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substantive visions of law or morality on clients amount to nothing more
than indefensible paternalism. This critique has special force when
lawyers are representing relatively powerless clients, who have few
alternative options for obtaining legal services. A theory that calibrates
lawyers' ethical priorities to context, however, avoids these charges
because it asks lawyers to impose other-regarding considerations on the
types of clients who can easily take their business elsewhere if they are
unhappy with their lawyer's representation. Indeed as Gordon has
eloquently pointed out, the force of moral suasion may not only lead
these clients to follow, but even to greatly value legal representation that
encompasses public interest considerations. 0 4 The justice-centered
theorists' ideal is that moral suasion will operate effectively in most
relationships between clients and trusted lawyers to produce publicregarding outcomes. Clients with alternative legal representation options
may value such outcomes far more than naysayers typically assume.
In any event, evaluation of clients' relative power as a factor in
lawyers' ethics analysis moves the focus away from demands that
lawyers impose their own substantive determinations of legal merits or
substantive morality on their cases, and towards a different focus which
calls on lawyers to avoid overpowering less powerful interests affected
by their representation.
Here again, obvious objections arise. Are not, one might ask,
determinations about relative power in particular contexts as contested
as are questions of justice based on interpretations of the purposes of law
or on moral considerations? How should relative power be determined?
Should it be based on access to material resources, political access,
membership in social networks of privilege, a combination of these
indices, or other factors? 105 Should it be analyzed relatively, absolutely,
in top-down terms (as the ability to command), or as something that
circulates and is never wholly absent or wholly secure (as a Foucauldian
would posit)? But these questions, while important, need not be
answered definitively for my proposal to work for the following
important reason: Assessments of relative power become more difficult
only as imbalances of power, apparent on any measure, become less
significant. In cases of substantial power imbalance-such as indigent
criminal defendants against the state, moderate-income neighborhoods
against corporate polluters, or poor tenants against landlords-the
104. See, e.g., Gordon, New Role, supra note 8, at 1190, 1194.
105. For a thoughtful article analyzing these different ideas about power, see Michael Hunter
Schwartz, Power Outage: Amplifying the Analysis of Power in Legal Relations (With Special
Application to UnconscionabilityandArbitration),33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 67 (1997).
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analysis of relative power will be readily apparent under any definition,
and it is precisely in these cases that lawyers' ethics analysis should be
influenced by considerations of client power. Where the affected parties
or interests are more evenly matched, on the other hand, the powerbased analysis is less concerned about the content of lawyers' ethical
norms, as I will discuss further in Part IV.
In short, consideration of client power offers a valuable
contribution to pure justice-based theories because questions of justice
become more difficult in close cases. Put otherwise, the problem of
lawyers' exercise of unduly subjective ideas of justice is exacerbated in
precisely those settings in which the exercise of such judgment, if not
sufficiently justified by consensus or objective warrant, becomes the
most, rather than the least, problematic. But a power-based view, which
adjusts the choice between client- versus justice-centered models
depending on the relative power of the client, avoids critiques based on
lawyer domination of those clients least able to resist, while retaining the
objective of stopping lawyers from assisting powerful clients in
undermining law's public purposes.
IV.

APPLYING A POWER-BASED ANALYSIS

In this section I illustrate a power-based analysis more concretely
by applying it to several categories of hypotheticals. The first category
consists of legal representations in cases involving adversaries or
affected interests of substantially unequal power. These are the scenarios
in which consideration of power as a factor in legal ethics analysis is
most important. A second category involves representations of clients
against the government, in which context I argue that consideration of
client power should continue to be a factor in lawyers' ethical judgment
calls. I also discuss examples of how a power-based analysis might work
with respect to several popular hypotheticals involving procedural and
evidentiary issues.
A.

RepresentationsInvolving Adversaries of Unequal Power

In the first category of representations, involving lawyers
representing less powerful clients against more powerful interests, a
power-based approach calls on the lawyer to exercise her ethical
discretion in favor of vigorous attention to the client's self-articulated
perspective and to advancing her client's interests. In contrast, lawyers
for more powerful clients should exercise their ethical discretion against
exploiting available legal strategies in ways that interfere with the ability
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of less powerful interests to have their positions considered in the legal
process. The lawyer for the more powerful client should still present her
client's substantive perspective, but should temper her presentation with
an eye to allowing full consideration of the interests of less powerful
constituencies.
In the hypotheticals that follow, I discuss just a few such examples,
borrowing primarily from scenarios other legal ethics scholars have
already offered, both to illustrate my proposed approach more concretely
and to highlight its contrasts to pure justice- and client-centered views. I
could have chosen a host of other examples; my selection is somewhat
arbitrary and certainly under-inclusive of the wide range of situations
calling for context-specific ethical judgment along the axis of client
power.
Drawing on the insights of client-centered analysis, I envision the
process of moral dialogue between client and lawyer that should occur. I
also highlight, as justice-centered ethics theorists do, the ultimate
decision to withdraw from the representation that the lawyer
representing powerful interests should make if consensus with the client
about other-regarding concerns in a particular situation ultimately cannot
be achieved. Critics point to this necessary consequence of the justicecentered approach-i.e., the prospect that a lawyer ultimately may be
required to withdraw from a representation-as proof of its
impracticality.' 0 6 But, as I have already discussed in Part III, this cannot
be a reason for discarding otherwise appropriate and justified principles
for ethical conduct. The very concept of ethics suggests that there is a
line that lawyers will desire to, but should not, cross. It is, indeed, the
existence of such lines-which should be explained thoroughly to the
client at the outset of the representation-that signals the existence of
ethics principles at all.
Hypothetical One: In his recent important article, Wendel offers the
example of a lawyer representing a coal company in a case involving a
claim for benefits by a miner suffering from black lung disease.,0 7 In the
first iteration of the hypothetical, the miner has a lesion on his lung
which measures 1.5 centimeters, sufficiently large to entitle him to

106.

See, e.g., FREEDMAN, supra note 49, at 33-34 (arguing that, in the context of client perjury

in a criminal case, lawyers should refrain from the ultimate step of withdrawing from the
representation); Pepper, supra note 14, at 630-33 (arguing that lawyers should discuss moral
questions with their clients, but should not conscientiously object to the amoral ethic, except in rare
occasions).
107. Wendel, supra note 6, at 389.
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benefits under the statute." 8 Wendel concludes, and I agree, that the
lawyer for the company should concede that the miner is entitled to
benefits, even though his client wishes to avoid paying benefits
wherever possible because doing so puts it at a competitive disadvantage
relative to foreign competitors that do not have to pay benefits to black
lung disease victims.
In a second iteration of this hypothetical, Wendel imagines that the
miner has received a lung transplant and is receiving powerful drugs to
prevent a rejection of the transplanted organ, which he is able to afford
only because he receives black lung benefits. A creative client
representative suggests that the lawyer argue that the miner's benefits
should be terminated, because he no longer has a 1.5 centimeter lesion
on his lung as required to trigger the statutory presumption of disability.
This would mean that the miner would have to establish his disability
through a lengthy administrative process, and in the meantime the
company would be entitled to terminate payment of benefits. The client
representative presses the lawyer to advance this argument, and Wendel
asks what the lawyer should do. 109
Wendel notes that under the dominant client-centered conception,
the lawyer should follow the client representative's instructions.' 10
Under Wendel's legalist approach, however, the lawyer should examine
the purposes of the black lung benefits law in facilitating coordinated
social action with respect to the administration of these benefits, and
should decline to file a motion for termination of benefits."' The stable
and clear meaning of the statute leads to the interpretation that it should
cover miners who have received a lung transplant due to black lung
that the
disease. Thus, Wendel notes, he arrives at the same conclusion
2
moralists do, albeit through a somewhat different path."l
An approach that factors client power into the analysis arrives at the
same conclusion that both the legalists and moralists do, albeit by a
different analytical route. Under a power-based analysis, the lawyer
should attempt first to persuade the client representative against insisting
on filing a motion to suspend benefits, but, if unable to do so, should
decline to pursue the coal company's objectives in the scenario posed

108.

Id. at 390.

109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392. He also arrives at the same conclusion Simon does, though his reasons for

following law and the guides he uses to interpret law differ. Id.; see also supra Part I.A.I
(discussing the differences between Simon's and Wendel's versions of legalism).
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above. He should do so, however, not because he believes the purpose of
the law is clear, but because his client is the more powerful interest in
the situation. To be sure, this step may lead the client representative to
seek new counsel. But the lawyer's position should not come as a
complete surprise to the mining company, provided that the lawyer has
explained at the outset of the representation that he subscribes to an
ethics view that calls on him to avoid steamrolling less powerful
interests. Although this disclosure may cause the lawyer to lose some
potential business, it may be attractive to clients who wish to enhance
their public reputation by signaling agreement with such publicregarding approaches to legal disputes-an advantage to encouraging the
bar to adopt a more public-regarding ethics that is vastly underestimated
in my view. 1 3 In any event, under an analysis concerned about relative
client power, the lawyer declines to argue for the termination of benefits
for the miner who has suffered a lung transplant. The difference between
this view and a justice-based approach can be illustrated by varying the
hypothetical once again.
Imagine the same set of facts, except this time, due to measurement
variation or a slight improvement in the miner's condition, the miner's
most recent medical records show a slight decrease in the size of his
lesion, so that it now appears to be slightly under the 1.5 centimeter
threshold for the statutory presumption of total disability, but is still
within the margin of possible measurement error. The lawyer for the
coal company notices this and discusses it with his client. The client
representative instructs him to file a motion for termination of benefits.
Here, as in the situation of the lung transplant, the coal company
lawyer should decline to file the motion despite his client's urging. Even
though the statutory purpose is clear and calls for the interpretation that a
1.5 centimeter lesion is the intended threshold for a presumption of
disability, the lawyer should resolve close cases in favor of his client's
adversary, the miner, because he has less overall power in the situation
and great need for the benefits provided when the coal company does not
dispute the presumption of disability.
Of course, slippery slope arguments can be made: What if the
miner's lesions measure only 1 centimeter, or .75 centimeters, or even
less? At what point does the coal company's lawyer cease to stay his
hand in arguing that the miner is not entitled to take advantage of the

113. For an analysis of the beneficial signaling function of creating a new category of lawyers
involved in a more public-regarding approach to regulatory compliance counseling, see Gordon,
New Role, supra note 8, at 1213.
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statutory presumption of disability? The answer to this question should
be calibrated to the situation: The lawyer should resolve ambiguous or
close questions in favor of the less powerful interests involved, but may
make tempered arguments pointing out that the requirements for the
statutory presumption are not met, and may make these arguments more
forcefully to the extent that the issue becomes less ambiguous or close to
the line. In other words, the lawyer may point out that the miner has
failed to meet the statutory presumption when this is clearly and
obviously the correct interpretation of the facts, even though he should
refrain from or substantially temper such arguments in close or
ambiguous cases.
In contrast, consider the case of the lawyer for the miner. Must the
lawyer for the miner point out the weakness in his client's case in the
situation in which the lesion appears to be slightly under the 1.5
centimeter threshold? Under the current Model Rules, the lawyer need
not do so; Rule 3.3 requires candor to the tribunal but does not require
affirmative disclosure of the weaknesses in one's case except in an ex
parte proceeding. On a legalist account, on the other hand, the lawyer
should do so, because this is the clear intent of the statute: Miners are
entitled to the statutory presumption of disability only if they meet the
statutorily defined threshold. Under a power-based analysis, the lawyer
should choose between these two alternatives based on the relative
power of his client. The lawyer for the miner need not point out the
weakness of his client's claim to the statutory presumption of
disability-within the range of evidentiary ambiguity, of coursebecause her client is the less powerful party. Again, this is not to say that
the lawyer may suborn perjury or falsify evidence, but simply that, in
that important and sometimes quite wide area of ethical discretion in
close cases that Simon has persuasively identified, the factor of client
power should lead the lawyer to resolve close judgment calls in favor of
her relatively less powerful adversary.
Of course here the moral issues are fairly clear: an individual is
suffering from an illness caused by his work for a company that has
profited from it; thus, a moralist would argue that he is entitled to
benefits in light of the overall injustice of the situation. But the powerbased view offers benefits to legal ethics analysis even in contexts where
the relative weight of moral considerations is more ambiguous, as in
Hypothetical Two below.
Hypothetical Two: Another helpful employment law case, this time
one that Simon discusses at length in his book, involves a labor law
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question. 14 Simon presents the facts in rich and realistic detail. A labor
union represents the clerical and technical workers at a wealthy private
university. The workers previously had been organized as a singleemployer local, but then merged with a larger local representing workers
from several employers. The merger did not work out well, however,
and the union and university workers' leaders agreed that the university
workers should revert to a single-employer local. The larger local
disclaimed interest in representing the university workers and purported
to delegate its representative function back to the reconstituted
university local. The reconstituted local held an election of bargaining
unit members who ratified the new arrangement 5by a five-to-one margin,
with fifty-five percent of those eligible voting. 1
On advice of counsel, however, the university now refuses to
recognize the reconstituted local or to deduct union dues under the
check-off provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. The
university argues that the larger local could not transfer its representative
authority to another entity without a representation election supervised
by the National Labor Relations Board. The union is strongly opposed to
this proposal for many reasons. It argues that holding such an election is
unnecessary in light of the result of its internal vote and would be very
burdensome to the union in terms of time, effort, and money. It would
require the union to resist the employer's anti-union campaigning and
would also expose the union to possible challenges from other unions
competing to represent the university's workers. The employer could
also contest the results of the representation election through
proceedings before the NLRB, which could take years to resolve. The
union's only recourse against the university would be to file a complaint
with the NLRB, arguing that the university is improperly failing to
observe the check-off provisions of the collective bargaining agreement,
but this claim would also take a great deal of money and time to resolve.
Simon's question is whether the lawyer for the university
should go
16
election."
representation
a
for
demand
the
filing
in
forward
Simon's conclusion is that the university lawyer should not file the
petition challenging the union's claim to legitimately represent the

114. I use employment and labor law cases, not only because they reflect my own former
practice context (I practiced at the union-side labor law firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser in Washington,
D.C., from 1991-96), but also because they involve organizational clients, namely, labor unions,
that can sometimes be the less powerful party, but in other contexts, such as in disputes against
individual members, are the more powerful adversary.
115. SIMON, supranote3, at 151.
116.

Id. at 152.

39

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:115

workers. 17 This is because the problem arose from procedural
irregularities and carelessness on the part of the union's leaders, but not
from any real concern that the local's representation is not genuinely
representative of the bargaining unit members' wishes. On a justicebased view, the university lawyer has responsibility to assess the
substantive merits of the university's argument in relation to the
purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. This assessment should
lead the lawyer to conclude that the university's argument is "supported
only by formal considerations that undercut the relevant statutory
purposes," and the lawyer therefore should not press the claim."H8 Simon
recognizes that the issues involved are complex, and that the analysis
changes depending on how one characterizes the perspectives of the
union and management and how one casts or weighs the complex,
multiple aspects of the statutory purposes involved."9 But, he concludes,
on balance, the university lawyer should stay her hand, in part because
matter and that there are
she "should recognize that she has a bias in' 2the
0
limitations on her knowledge of the union."'
Invoking the potential for lawyer bias seems somewhat problematic
in this and many other examples of justice-based analysis, however,
because of the very small difference in many situations between bias and
situated perspective. What might to one person appear to be bias is
another's compelling truth. In Simon's scenario, for example, many of
the justifications the university offers for its perspective would appear
eminently persuasive to some observers-such as that the local is out of
touch with its membership, is not representing the workers well, has
within it dissidents whose views deserve a chance to be heard, may have
pressured voters in its internal vote, and in general deserves to face a test
of its support in which members can reconsider their interests and the
21
university can counter the deceptions the union has made in the past.1
Indeed, the inevitability of strongly diverging situated perspectives
formed by socialization in particular practice contexts is a point on
22 and one to which Simon
which commentators have challenged Simon,
123
response.
has failed to offer an adequate

117. Id.
118.

Id.

119. Seeid. at 152-53.
120.

Id. at 154.

121.

Seeid. at 153.

122.

See, e.g., Rostain, supranote 8, at 956 (challenging Simon on these grounds).

123. See Simon, Rejoinder, supra note 44, at 1004-06 (dismissing Rostain's argument without
sustained analysis).
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A power-based perspective, in contrast, offers a cleaner analysis.
The power-based view agrees with the justice-based analysis in the
above situation, but for a different reason. The justice-centered analysis
posits that the university lawyer should not challenge the representation
petition because she has reason to believe that a majority of the union's
members do support representation, and the public purposes underlying
the procedures for challenging union representation claims exist to
resolve legitimate doubts on this question. Adding the factor of relative
client power leads to the conclusion that the university lawyer should not
challenge the union's representation claim because lawyers for more
powerful clients should resolve close ethical questions with an eye
toward protecting the interests of the less powerful adversary.
Here again, the decision must of course be made in consultation
with the client representative, and in the course of that consultation, the
lawyer may learn facts that change the analysis. It may appear that there
is a minority in the union's membership whose interests the union is
failing to represent, and that attention to the interests of this less
powerful constituency within the union militates in favor of challenging
the union's assertion of continued representation authority. Finally, the
client representative's position with the employer very likely will color
her statement of the facts, and the lawyer will be required to assess the
factors at work in shaping the representative's depiction. The lawyer
must of course make judgment calls within a realm of uncertainty on all
such matters, and has every right to give his client the benefit of the
doubt along the way. But consideration of client power calls on the
lawyer to seek to avoid using legal processes in ways that interfere with
the ability of less powerful interests to receive due attention to the
substantive merits of their legal positions-including not forcing
unnecessary expenditures of legal resources to test claims that have little
validity. Where the lawyer's best judgment is that the client is seeking to
do this, the lawyer should insist to the point of possible withdrawal from
the representation that such tactics not be pursued.
Thus a model that factors in client power, like justice-based
approaches, asks lawyers to act with an eye to ultimate justice, but in a
different manner and sometimes with different results. The difference
between power-based and substantive justice-based approaches can be
further demonstrated by once again altering the hypothetical.
Imagine that the lawyer making the ethical judgment call is the
lawyer for the union. Imagine further that this lawyer has strong reason
to believe that the union may no longer enjoy the support of a majority
of the local's members. Should the lawyer stay her hand and decline to
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use the strategies available to resist management's call for a
decertification vote?
Simon's answer must be yes: The union lawyer, recognizing that
the purposes underlying the procedures for requesting representation
votes are designed to detect the true wishes of bargaining unit members,
should decline to engage in strategies available to her which (in my
former practice experience) generally involve slowing down the timeline
for holding such an election by vigorously searching out and filing
potentially meritorious unfair labor practice charges.' 24 Indeed, speaking
now as a former union-side labor lawyer involved in representing union
locals in decertification cases in an era of declining union membership, I
will openly confess that I find such a justice-focused position unsettling
as tested against the intuitions developed through immersion in an actual
practice context. No union-side labor lawyer worth that title would have
conceded a decertification case simply because it was reasonably clear
that the eventual result would be loss of the bargaining unit. Doing so
would mean the loss of significant resources in terms of years of
additional dues, egg on the union's face, and the potential for spiraling
losses as news of one successful decertification campaign spread to other
locals. Of course, the intuitions of lawyers socialized into particular
practice contexts cannot be the guide to ethical appropriateness in
general-that lack of reflectivity is, indeed, the phenomenon the many
schools of critical legal ethics scholars identified in Part II are seeking to
resist. But the legalists' failure to capture the moral intuition that more
zealousness is owed the representation of the client's interests in the
context of representing the underdog in many situations is a factor
deserving of further analysis.
Hypothetical Three: Here is another example, again drawn in very
general terms from my own former practice experience. Imagine a
predominantly white union local sued by an African-American member
on duty of fair representation ("DFR") charges. The member alleges that
the leaders of the local illegitimately blocked him and other AfricanAmericans from running for leadership positions in the local. The
lawyer's investigation gives her reason to suspect that there is at least
some merit to the union member's allegations. The lawyer has
considerable experience in handling and securing the dismissal of DFR

124.

Here again, I am not arguing that lawyers for less powerful interests may flout the bounds

of legitimate advocacy or the bounds of ethical discretion; I am confining my analysis for now to
discretionary judgment calls within the existing rules.
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claims. Should the lawyer zealously pursue the dismissal of such
charges?
My answer in this situation is no. In comparison to the union
member, the union local is the more powerful party, and the lawyer
should exercise her ethical discretion in favor of protecting the interests
of the African-American union members and against vigorous advocacy
of the interests of her client, the union local, in early dismissal of the
case. Again, this is not to say that the lawyer should abdicate
representation of the union local, but only that the lawyer should resolve
close judgment calls in favor of the less powerful adversary. Here again,
both legalist and moralist justice-centered ethicists would agree. But a
power-based approach works better because it accounts for both the
moral intuition that the union lawyer should fight zealously against the
management-sponsored decertification election, and that she should not
adopt this stance against the potentially meritorious race discrimination
claim filed by the local's African-American members. One context calls
for a client-centered approach and the other for the opposite; the power
relationship between the parties explains this difference.
A moralist might argue that what accounts for the difference in the
two cases is the more morally problematic nature of seeking to defeat a
potentially meritorious race discrimination claim as compared to
contesting a potentially legitimate argument for union decertification.
But any such argument must assume relatively broad consensus on
moral questions, which in fact does not exist on the union decertification
question, as I have already noted. To some, a union's continued claim to
representation status when it lacked majority support would be morally
problematic indeed. Moreover, the duty of fair representation
hypothetical works even for a far less morally weighted DFR claim with
no race issues involved.' 25
Hypothetical Four: A final example that demonstrates the
differences among the client-centered, justice-centered, and power-based
approaches comes from zealous representation advocate Monroe
Freedman's divorce representation hypothetical, as borrowed by Simon
126
in order to highlight the contrasts between Freedman and himself. In

125.

See, e.g., Truck Drivers & Helpers Local Union 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137, 139-40

(D.C. Cir. 1967). This DFR case involved the merger of the seniority lists of a large and a small
union local after two companies employing the unions' members merged. On a power-based
analysis, in this scenario, if there were a substantial imbalance between the power of the large and
small locals, the lawyer for the significantly more powerful local should seek to avoid trampling on
the interests of the members of the less powerful one.
126. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 9, 141.
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Freedman's scenario, a lawyer represents a husband seeking a divorce
from his wife. The wife asks the husband for financial information, and
the lawyer knows that the husband has income about which the wife is
unaware. The wife is represented by a "bomber" lawyer, however, who
"has no value in life other than stripping the husband of every penny and
piece of property he has, at whatever cost to the personal relations and
children, or anything else., 127 Freedman argues that the lawyer should
not disclose his client's confidence because it is not the role of the
lawyer to be a conduit of information to his client's adversary; other
aspects of the legal system are designed to provide the machinery for
uncovering falsehood.
Simon agrees with Freedman's conclusion, but for different
reasons. Simon argues that since the "disclosure of the husband's actual
income to the 'bomber' may prompt escalation of the already unfair
demands," it may be appropriate to defer disclosure until it becomes
clear "whether the case is likely to be resolved fairly without it."',28 On a
power-based analysis, in contrast, the lawyer for the more powerful
client, which the hypothetical implies is the husband, should provide the
information, even if the lawyer for the wife appears to be a bomber.
Indeed, the lawyer representing the less powerful client-in Freedman's
hypothetical, apparently the wife-should, in circumstances of
significant inequality of resources, be more "bomber"-like, seeking
maximum economic resources and other advantages for her client, even
though it would be ethically inappropriate for the husband to do so.
This hypothetical takes on particular significance in light of recent
detailed empirical research into the practice context of divorce law. In an
excellent recent study of divorce law practice in several small New
England towns, Lynn Mather and her colleagues document the intraprofessional dynamics produced by the introduction of a new generation
of women lawyers, many of whom came with ideologically driven,
feminist motivations to their work, into a practice community best
described as having been in the past an "old boy network.' ' 129 The oldtimer members of this formerly staid practice community, cognizant of
their need to go back to the same small group of other practitioners in
future cases, had developed informal practice norms that frowned upon
aggressive positions in discovery and negotiations. The new female
lawyers, in contrast, who tended to represent women in divorce cases,

127. Id. at 141 (endnote omitted).
128. Id. at 142.
129. MATHER, supra note 8, at 125.
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eschewed these collegial practice norms, refused to take the husbands'
lawyers at their word about financial asset and other suspect
information, and began making onerous discovery demands, leading the
old timers to brand them as unduly aggressive and lacking in
collegiality. 30
This empirical example is rich with implications for legal ethics
theory.131 For my purposes here, its main lesson is that behavior that
appears to reflect overly aggressive client-centered lawyering from the
perspective of lawyers comfortable in traditional practice communities
may appear from other practice perspectives to be necessary zealous
advocacy in the interests of the underdog. From this vantage point,
denunciations of zealous, client-centered ethics appear tinged with selfinterested bias and the privileging of the interests supported by the status
quo.
Hypothetical Five: A final example, discussed over the years by
many ethics commentators, involves David Dudley Field's
representation of Jim Fisk and Jay Gould in the Erie Railroad scandals of
the 1860s. The scandals involved fraudulent stock manipulations, looting
of company assets, and bribery and corruption of the state legislature.
Although it does not appear that Field took part in or assisted his clients
in any illegal conduct, he mounted an aggressive legal defense of them.
In justification of his zealous representation, Field invoked Lord
Erskine's defense of Tom Paine when he was charged with seditious
libel after publishing The Rights of Man, including Lord Erskine's
famous speech championing the need for lawyers' independence and
zealous advocacy in order to protect civil liberties.' 32 Simon correctly
points out the inappropriateness of Field's comparison of his
the
representation posture to Lord Erskine's in the Paine case in light of
133
very different contexts in which the two representations took place.
But Simon's analysis of this difference is unpersuasive. According
to Simon, the important difference in the Fisk and Gould case was

See id.at 55-56.
See Susan D. Carle, The Effect of Context on Practice, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1347 (2004)
(reviewing LYNN MATHER ET AL., DIVORCE LAWYERS AT WORK: VARIETIES OF PROFESSIONALISM
130.
131.

INPRACTICE (2001)) (discussing implications for legal ethics study of Mather's findings).
132. See Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their
Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 508-09 (1994) (citing THOMAS ERSKINE, TRIAL OF THOMAS PAINE

(22 How. St. Tr. 1792)). Erskine's often quoted words were: "From the moment that any advocate
can be permitted to say, that he will or will not stand between the Crown and the subject arraigned
in the court where he daily sits to practice, from that moment the liberties of England are at an end."
Id. at 509 n.4.
133.

See SIMON, supra note 3, at 161-62.
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"procedural failure that triggers responsibility to assess substantive
merit."' 134 But this does not fully explain the intuition that there is an
important difference between the two examples, because there were
significant procedural concerns in the Paine case as well, but in that
case, those concerns were reason for more zealous representation.
Instead, the underlying reason that called for justice-centeredness in the
Fisk and Gould case was the power of these clients to use their huge
financial resources to corrupt the legislature and otherwise exploit and
manipulate procedures to further their nefarious ends. In the Paine case,
by contrast, the problems with the fallibility and potential weaknesses of
procedural protections were dangerous to Paine, not to the public
interest. In other words, the real difference between the two cases was
that the power imbalance in the Paine case-a powerful government
against an unpopular individual-favored zealous advocacy in favor of
the relatively powerless client, whereas the power analysis in the Fisk
and Gould situation favored attention to the interests of stockholders and
the public.
B.

Representationof Clients Against the Government

The same considerations explain the strong moral intuition that
zealous client advocacy is appropriate in representing an individual
against the power of the state. Adding a focus on relative client power in
particular situations into the analysis, however, suggests that this
presumption should not always hold, especially in representations of
powerful organizational clients against government lawyers with
comparatively limited resources.
1. Representation of Powerful Interests Against the Government
Simon, Wendel, Gordon and others use many examples involving
the representation of powerful clients against the government to
illustrate the merits of a justice-centered view. Classic chestnuts of this
type include post-mortem commentary on the Savings and Loan crisis of
the 1980s 135 and, more recently, the involvement of lawyers in the Enron
collapse. 36 In all of these examples, justice-centered theorists, whether
legalists or moralists, agree that the lawyers should have been far less

134.
135.
136.

Id.
See, e.g., Simon, Kaye Scholer, supranote 74; Wilkins, supra note 75.
See Gordon, New Role, supranote 8; David Luban, Making Sense of Moral Meltdowns, in

LAWYERS' ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER

355 (Susan D. Carle

ed., 2005).
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zealous on their clients' behalf and should have served far more of a
law-protecting role. A power-based view agrees with this analysis, but
for different reasons.
The reason the lawyers should have been less zealous in their
advocacy for their clients in these situations is not simply that they
should have sought to preserve the purposes of law or morality, but also
because, in context (vis A vis government agencies with relatively
limited personnel resources for investigation of corporate wrongdoing),
these lawyers' corporate clients were, in some respects, the more
powerful entity. At the very least, these clients had much more
equivalency of resources in terms of their ability to evade detection of
wrongdoing by government agencies engaged in compliance monitoring
and civil enforcement actions. In such situations involving government
investigations of powerful entities that can outmatch, or at least rival, the
resources of state and even federal law enforcement agencies, the lawyer
for a powerful private client should exercise discretion against exploiting
tactical advantages for his client and in favor of protecting the public
policy interests the government is seeking to uphold.
2. Criminal Defense Representations
A power-based analysis also does a much better job than its
alternatives in explaining why criminal defense is different. Although
Simon,' 37 Luban 3 8 and others have attempted to resolve the puzzle
presented by our strong moral intuition that criminal defense is in fact
different, commentators have not found these attempts at distinguishing
39
the criminal defense context convincing. A power-based analysis, on
the other hand, has no difficulty explaining why criminal defense is, in
most situations, different: It is different because, when the government is
pursuing an individual defendant, the government has access to the
potentially overwhelming force of the state. Especially in cases of
indigent defendants, but also in cases of well-off criminal defendants
such as O.J. Simpson, the potential power of the government relative to
that of the defendant is huge indeed. But here again, the criminal defense
lawyer should sometimes take into account the relative balance of power
vis-A-vis the interests she is opposing. Some tactics may be fair game but
others not. In the O.J. Simpson case, for example, the government
possessed extraordinary powers to enter Simpson's property and conduct
137. See SIMON, supra note 3, at 170-94.
138.

See LUBAN, supra note 8.

139. See, e.g., SIMON, supra note 3, at 174, 177, 183-84 (criticizing Luban's analysis of why
criminal law is different).
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searches and seizures at that property and at the crime scene-and
potentially, to abuse those powers by planting evidence or similar
tactics. Simpson's defense team was, accordingly, well justified in its
zealous attempts to cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence obtained
through these extraordinary government powers. In contrast, Simpson
possessed superior resources with respect to the quality, experience, and
talent of his defense team, as compared to the obviously out-matched
prosecutorial team of Marcia Clark and Christopher Darden. In this
arena, in which Simpson's resources and power were superior to those of
the government, his lawyers were not ethically entitled to engage in
tactics such as "blizzarding" the government with motions to which the
government lacked sufficient resources to respond.
In a third scenario, the criminal defense lawyer is representing a
defendant with respect to pretrial release. The lawyer has reason to
believe her client is a threat to vulnerable persons in the community if
released, but also must consider the advantages of pretrial release to the
defendant in preparing a defense. Here the lawyer faces a difficult
ethical dilemma. Contrary to other approaches, which simply assert that
criminal defense is different, a power-based analysis could call on the
lawyer to weigh her client's relative powerlessness in relation to the
state against her client's potential threat to vulnerable members of the
outside community. On the other hand, this is the judge's role in the pretrial release hearing, and to the extent that the judge can be counted on to
perform it adequately, the lawyer can focus on the need to defend her
client. But in situations in which the lawyer is better situated to make
judgments about danger to the community than is the court-as, for
example, when the lawyer has information about her client's intent to
cause harm that the court does not-a power-based approach may call
on the lawyer to adjust the zealousness of her representation to take
account of the interests threatened by it.
This result clashes dramatically with criminal defenders' legal
ethics sensibilities. As many have pointed out to me, there are almost
always vulnerable victims somewhere in the potential ambit of concern
in criminal cases, and a criminal defender could virtually never give her
client zealous advocacy if she were attempting to balance these interests
against her client's. It may well be that the criminal defense context is
different because of the important individual rights issues, highlighted
through classical liberal analysis, 40 that are at stake when natural beings
face the force of the state. An ethics stance that mandates that criminal
140.

See supra Part III.B.2.
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defense lawyers engage in zealous client-centered advocacy may be
justified on rule utilitarian grounds. Because zealous advocacy is usually
due criminal defendants as against the potentially powerful force of the
state, it is best that criminal defense lawyers adopt this stance in all
aspects of their representations.
In sum, although I confess to continuing ambivalence on this
question, I am at this point willing to agree that a bright-line rule of
zealous advocacy is appropriate in defending natural persons in the
criminal justice context, largely because such an irrebutable presumption
serves to "hard wire" defense counsel to adopt the ethics stance that is
most often appropriate.
In all events, a power-based analysis suggests that criminal defense
is not different in all respects or all contexts. This is most obvious under
a power-based analysis in contexts involving government prosecutions
of corporate crime. In this situation, criminal defense lawyers should
possess some of the duties justice-centered advocates recognize in the
civil context, especially with regard to avoiding the exploitation of
strategic opportunities-through stonewalling and the like-that
interfere with the government's ability to enforce the law.
C. ProceduralandEvidentiary Matters
Another set of issues on which to test application of a power-based
analysis concerns lawyers' ethical deliberations in procedural and
evidentiary matters. To take one classic dilemma: A lawyer has reason to
believe she can impeach a handwriting expert who tends to be nervous
on the stand by surreptitiously substituting a writing with a signature
different from the one the expert witness had previously identified. The
client-centered advocacy view tends to permit such tactics; the justicecentered approach tends to disapprove of them.' 41 The justice-based
approach asks whether the tactic would help the judge or jury decide the
case fairly. If the lawyer believes the expert witness has correctly
identified the handwriting, she should not attempt the impeachment
tactic because it will "impede rather than enhance the adjudicator's
ability to decide fairly.' ' 142 But if the lawyer has good reason to believe
the contrary, she may appropriately decide to use the tactic because it
will contribute to a fair decision. The power-based approach, in contrast,
would respond to context, adding as a factor for consideration the
relative balance of power between the two parties. This explains, for
141.

See SIMON, supra note 3, at 143.

142.

Id.
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example, the moral intuition that it would be appropriate for a criminal
defense attorney to engage in deceptive impeachment tactics, but
completely inappropriate for a prosecutor to do so.
In short, while Simon says that a justice-oriented lawyer should
respond to procedural defects by trying to mitigate them, and "[t]o the
extent that the lawyer cannot neutralize defects... she should assume
direct responsibility for the substantive validity of the decision" by
forming her "own judgment about the proper substantive resolution and
tak[ing] reasonable actions to bring it about,"' 143 consideration of client
power leads to a different approach. It does not call on the lawyer to
enter into the murky realm of substantive validity determinations, but
instead asks her to temper her representations to the extent that they
threaten to prevent consideration of the interests of less powerful
affected parties.
D.

Representation of Interests Substantially Equal in Power

A final category of representations involves those in which lawyers
are representing adversaries of relatively equal power and no other
significant interests are at stake. Here we might imagine transactional
work involving similarly situated parties or corporate insurance
litigation, for example. To be sure, even in such representations, thirdparty interests may be affected, and to that extent, consideration of client
power should be a factor in lawyers' resolution of close ethical judgment
calls. But to the extent that obvious and substantial power disparities do
not appear to be hampering the fairness of the representation, lawyers
need not worry about relative client power in making ethical judgment
calls.
Another example of a situation in which consideration of client
power will not provide a helpful guide in lawyers' ethical deliberations
is in the representation of competing interests that are substantially
similar in that all have relatively little power. The scenario of a public
interest lawsuit in which many interests, none with substantially
disproportionate power, are at stake comes to mind. 144 Here, too, the

143. Id. at 140.
144. For an example of such a situation, see Fiandacav. Cunningham, 827 F.2d 825 (1st Cir.
1987) (examining conflict of interest problem raised where the remedy sought by New Hampshire

Legal Assistance ("NHLA") on behalf of a client class of female inmates in the state prison, which
would have involved building a new facility for them with programs and services equivalent to
those provided to male inmates, would interfere with the interests of another NHLA client class,
consisting of citizens with mental retardation, whose sole care and treatment facility would have
provided the site for building this facility for the women inmates).
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balance of power among lawyers, clients, and affected individuals is
sufficiently complex and multi-sided as to render a power-based analysis
unhelpful-except, of course, as to interests such as those represented by
competing organizations that have substantially fewer material or social
resources at their disposal. But in those aspects of cases involving
relatively balanced or impenetrably complex power relationships among
competing interests, a power-based analysis cannot guide the ethics
stance that lawyers should apply.
Again, questions instantly arise as to how large this set of such
representations involving complex and multi-sided power relationships
may be. In the new post-post-modem paradigm, theorists have begun to
emphasize the flux and instability of power relations in many such
scenarios. But the empirical question of how broad the range of cases
involving obvious and substantial imbalances of power need not be
resolved here. The point is simply that in that range of cases,
considerations of client power should factor into lawyers' ethical
deliberations.
In situations that fall outside the substantial power-imbalance
paradigm, other ethics considerations must apply. In middle-of-the-road
cases, it may well be that lawyers should be free to set their norms of
ethical practice by agreement. These may be zealous advocacy norms,
norms calling for polite deference to opposing counsel, or postures
somewhere in between. Moreover, in these cases, context-dependent
problems of moral hazard with respect to lawyers' orientation to their
client vis d vis other affected interests are not as great. Accordingly, the
need for an ethics norm that arises from concern about the effects of
power on the working of the legal system is not as great either.
This point can be further illustrated by considering several
hypotheticals in which power considerations are too complex for a
power-based analysis to apply. Consider, for example, the representation
of organizations dedicated to advancing "pro-choice" or "pro-life"
positions on the abortion issue. Here it is not clear which group currently
has more social, economic, and political power. Wendel's analysis of
precisely this question under his version of a legalist approach provides
a helpful answer: Because both groups are relatively well represented in
political processes, the lawyer's appropriate ethical role should be to
adopt a relatively evenhanded stance.145 In this situation, viewed from

145. See Wendel, supra note 6, at 414 ("The views of both pro-life and pro-choice voters have
been adequately represented in the political process. Their contributions to the debate have been a
feature of the legislative and litigation battles that have resulted in the existing laws respecting
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the perspective of the relative power of the two political groups
involved-as from the legalists' concern with procedural reliability,
which is the focus of Wendel's analysis-lawyers' ethical deliberation
need not concern itself with distortions potentially caused by imbalance
in the political power of the client groups they represent.
This example is particularly interesting, however, because it also
illustrates how a power-based analysis accommodates pluralist
substantive views on moral issues in a way that pure justice-centered
approaches cannot. Lawyers with particular ethical convictions might
see the situation as something quite different from what Wendel sees as
a battle between groups with adequate procedural and political access. A
lawyer who believes abortion is murder, for example, will see the
situation as involving the protection of the rights of powerless unborn
children. 146 A lawyer who believes anti-abortion laws punish poor
women will view his appropriate ethics stance as requiring zealous
advocacy on behalf of the beneficiaries of laws that permit abortion. But
under an approach that calls on lawyers to consider clients' relative
power in the representation, it does not matter that different people with
different moral convictions would likely also see questions concerning
power differently. There is no reason the results of lawyers'
consideration of their clients' relative power must be the same for all
lawyers. Instead, what is helpful about considering relative client power
is that this factor offers a coherent criterion to help guide lawyers'
exercise of discretionary judgment. It pushes in a direction most likely to
correct for the tug of self-interest and the distortion of legal processes by
over-zealous representation, while also allowing for the irresolvable
pluralism of people's moral and political views.
Another example a friendly critic has offered me: Consider the
situation presented in Payne v. Tennessee.147 There the defendant
committed a brutal murder of a mother and young child and attempted
murder of a surviving child. The grandmother testified at a death penalty
sentencing proceeding as to the painful effect of the loss of his mother
abortion. Whether we regard the laws as an imperfect compromise or as legalized injustice, they are
not the product of the systematic exclusion of one point of view from the public forum.").
146. See, e.g., Teresa Stanton Collett, Speak No Evil, Seek No Evil, Do No Evil: Client
Selection and Cooperation with Evil, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1370 (1998) ("When the object of

the association is evil, regardless of the intent of the association, the lawyer and the community
should not assist the association in achieving its object. For example, a medical facility seeking to
expand its service to include abortion has no moral claim for assistance, even in those instances
where the intention of the association is to protect women against the dangers of self-induced
abortions ....).
147.

501 U.S. 808 (1991).
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and sister on the surviving child's life. The Supreme Court accepted
certiorari to consider constitutional questions related to the admission of
victim impact statements in capital sentencing proceedings. The U.S.
government argued in favor of the admissibility of such statements;
some state governments argued against them. How would a power
analysis work here?
At the U.S. Supreme Court level, a power analysis would have little
applicability. The setting calls for a vigorous and unrestrained airing of
all substantive arguments expert advocates can craft, pro and con. But in
a context without all the trappings of a highly public, sharply focused,
national-level debate about the development of principles of public
reason, a more careful consideration of power dynamics would be
warranted. The lawyer for the defendant facing the death penalty
obviously should provide unreservedly zealous representation for his
client. The prosecutor in this situation, to my mind, would justifiably
weigh the probable harm to future community members strongly in the
balance in urging consideration of victim impact testimony. The state
and federal government positions reflect analyses of the positions of
those authorized within both levels of government to determine
questions of legal policy, and should not weigh significantly in one
direction or the other on a power-based analysis.
E. ConsideringIntangible Interests
Another set of interesting hypotheticals raises the question of how
lawyers should take into account intangible interests, such as the
48
interests in avoiding the perpetuation of negative racial stereotyping, 50
improving racial relations, 149 or preventing harm to the environment.

148.

See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Defending Racial Violence, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1995)

(studying the historical intersection of race, lawyers, and ethics in the context of the American
criminal justice system, specifically in cases of black-on-white racial violence); Anthony V. Alfieri,
Impoverished Practices,81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993) (discussing judgments made by poverty lawyers
in representing their clients); Anthony V. Alfieri, Lynching Ethics: Toward a Theory of Racialized
Defenses, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1063 (1997) (investigating the rhetoric of race or race-talk in criminal
defense advocacy and ethics within the context of racially motivated private violence); Anthony V.
Alfieri, Race-ing Legal Ethics, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 800 (1996) (defending his theories as challenged
by Robin D. Barnes in Interracial Violence and Racialized Narrative: Discovering the Road Less
Traveled, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 788 (1996)).

149. See Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer's Duty to
Work for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901 (1995) (proposing a rule requiring lawyers
working on racially tense cases to initially pursue nonadversarial approaches).
150. See, e.g., David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A Call for Judicial
Protectionof the Public'sInterest in Environmentally CriticalResources, 12 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
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These intangible interests often are not attached to particular parties or
persons and become all the more fragile by virtue of this fact. But the
fact that such interests are intangible does not mean that they cannot be
factored into the ethical calculations of lawyers representing powerful
clients. There are a host of important, fragile, yet nevertheless fully
cognizable interests lawyers for powerful clients would be ethically
charged with protecting under my model. These include interests in
preserving public access to information and knowledge and other aspects
of the public commons, 151 avoiding environmental harms, and protecting
against financial harm that will be borne by future generations. To be
sure, in these contexts especially, a power-based analysis becomes very
much like a justice-centered analysis because the lawyer is thinking
about the balance of affected interests-much like a judge thinks about
justice-removed from the presence of a tangible "other" capable of
articulating a position to which the lawyer may show consideration. But
someone surely should be looking out for these interests in situations of
procedural breakdown or unreliability, as the justice-centered theorists
have long and persuasively argued. A model that calls on lawyers to
concern themselves about these issues when representing powerful
clients is worth pursuing.
V.

CONCLUSION

A host of commentators, writing with a variety of intellectual
commitments, have criticized justice-centered assumptions that an ethics
dictate involving the pursuit of justice can be accomplished by applying
discretionary judgment in interpreting law. 152 Yet another critique,
drawn from post-modernism and liberalism alike, attacks notions of
locating justice in substantive morality. Even justice-centered theorists
such as Simon and Wendel readily acknowledge that law and justice
cannot be equated in some realms. 153 In these areas there appears to be a
fundamental injustice in positive law, or as Simon might put it, a
disjunction between narrow positive law and more just norms which
exist at a broader level in the legal culture. At bottom, the dispute
311 (1988) (discussing conflicts between public and private rights in land from an ecological
perspective).
Clinic,
Law
Property
Intellectual
Glushko-Samuelson
e.g.,
151. See,
(describing clinical program devoted to
http://www.wcl.american.edu/ipclinic/index.cfm
representing public interest in preserving an intellectual property "commons") (last visited Nov. 14,
2006).
152. See sources cited supra note 29.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33, 35.
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between justice- and client-based analyses may come down to no more
than different points of view about the general justice, validity, or
trustworthiness of the legal system overall. Legalists can be comfortable
with a justice-based orientation to legal ethics analysis because they
view the legal system as fundamentally just, with some pockets of
political or procedural breakdown. Those in the rebellious lawyering
tradition view such problematic areas of law as criminal justice and
welfare rights as emblematic of a legal system lacking in justice in more
fundamental respects.
Put otherwise, a legalist analysis only works where, at bottom, law
is fundamentally just. To the extent that-or in those areas of law in
which-this claim cannot be supported, some other theory is required. A
power-based analysis offers such an alternative. When representing the
interests of those lacking in relative power, lawyers should seek to
refrain from lawyer domination, encourage the development of their
clients' perspectives, and engage in vigorous client-centered
representation. When representing clients with the power to do great
harm to those less powerful, on the other hand, lawyers should avoid
strategies that interfere with full consideration of the less powerful
interests affected by their representations. This context-specific approach
could well be codified through an overhaul of the model rules, but can
and should be adopted by lawyers in their exercise of discretionary
ethical judgment even within the framework of the current rules.
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